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NECESSITOUS INTERVENTION:
THE ALTRUISTIC
INTERMEDDLER AND THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION
John D. McCamnus*
1. INTRODUCTION
A person who responds in a selfless manner to another's necessitous
circumstances by providing appropriate assistance will deserve, and will
often receive, expressions of gratitude and esteem. The altruist is among the
most cherished of our fellows. It is another matter, of course. %%hether
altruistic interventions ought to give rise to a duty on the part of the recipient
of such assistance to render compensation for the value of benefits received.
In the past, the courts have evidenced some reluctance to grant recovery to
the intervenor. especially where the benefit conferred consists of the
preservation of another's property. I More recently. however, it seems to
have been accepted as a general principle that one who, being an appropriate
person to do so, responds to another's emergency by supplying (or by
arranging at his own expense for the supply of) needed goods, services, or
money. is entitled to restitution for the value of these benefits, provided that
their conferral was not intended as a gift. For convenience, this general
principle will be referred to here as the principle of necessitous intervention.
It is the purpose of this article to explore the evidence to be found in the case
law manifesting an acceptance of this principle and to suggest % hat appear
to the writer to be fruitful lines of analysis in areas of the case la%% where the
principle has not as yet been full), embraced.
The policy served by the necessitous intervention principle may be that
which is said to underlie the roughly analogous civilian doctrine, negotiorun
gestio .2 Recovery for the value of benefits conferred is permitted as a means
- Associate Professor of Law. Osgoode Hall La'% School. York University I would
like to thank my colleague. Harry Glasbeek. for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this article.
'See pp. 315-20, infra.
2 For an account of the early histor) of this doctrine. see W Bt'( Ki kND. A
TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LA\\ 537-38 (3d ed. 1963): H Jot o\% l(/ ANt) B NiHot s,
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LA\% 298 (3d ed. 1972) For a
detailed examination of the evolution of the doctrine in modern civilian jurisdictions, see
Dawson. Negotiorum Gestio: The Airuistic Intermeddler. 74 H.R'. L RE\ 817. 1073
(1961).
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of encouraging interventions which are perceived to be socially useful.a An
alternative and, arguably, preferable rationale is supplied by the principle of
unjust enrichment which holds that one ought to pay for the value of benefits
received at another's expense where it would be inequitable or "against
conscience" to fail to do so. For some time, this has been recognized by the
American courts 4 to be the general theme which unifies the restitutionary
case law, including the necessitous intervention cases,5 and provides a
theoretical underpinning for the imposition of liability, which is distinct
from the theories of obligation underlying the other major subjects of our
private law, contract and tort. I Following this American lead, the Supreme
Court of Canada has expressly adopted the unjust enrichment principle as
the juristic basis for much of what was formerly characterized as
"quasi-contract" r and appears to have accepted, as do the Americans, that
it also offers the proper explanation for liabilities imposed through the
device of the constructive trust.' It would, of course, be consistent with
these developments (if, indeed, it is not dictated by them) to recognize that
the recovery granted in the necessitous intervention cases is, in Canadian
I Cf. the following statement, taken from Justinian, setting forth the rationale for the
doctrine of negotiorum gestio:
The reason of this is the general convenience; otherwise people might be
summoned away by some sudden event of pressing importance, and without
commissioning anyone to look after and manage their affairs, the result of
which would be that during their absence those affairs would be entirely
neglected; and of course no one would be likely to attend to them if he were to
have no action for the recovery of any outlay he might have incurred in so
doing.
See Justinian, Inst. lib. III, tit. xxvii, s. 1, quoted in Williston, Agency of Necessity, 22
CAN. B. REV. 492, at 492-93, n. 4 (1944).
4 See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1937) [hereinafter
cited as RESTITUTION]; G. PALMER, 1-4 THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978).
'See RESTITUTION, supra note 4, at ss. 112-17; PALMER, supra note 4, at ch. 10;
Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1183
(1965-66).
6 Contract serves the general policy objective of enforcing promises. It enforces
voluntarily assumed promissory obligations and awards remedies calculated to give the
promisee the promised performance (specific performance) or its equivalent in money
(damages). Tort serves the policy of requiring wrongdoers to compensate for injuries
caused by their conduct. It imposes an involuntary duty on wrongdoers to compensate
their victims and measures compensable loss by the extent of the injury sustained by the
plaintiff. Restitution serves the objective of preventing unjust enrichment. It imposes an
involuntary duty to disgorge the value of the benefit received and measures its relief in
terms of the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant at the plaintiff's expense. See
generally R. GOFF AND G. JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION ch. I (2d ed. 1978).
'The critical authority is Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co., [1954] S.C.R. 725,
[1954] 3 D.L.R. 785. See also Rural Municipality of Storthoaks v. Mobil Oil Canada
Ltd., [197612 S.C.R. 147, 55 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (1975); County of Carleton v. City of Ottawa.
[19651 S.C.R. 663, 52 D.L.R. (2d) 220. And see generally McCamus, Restitutionary
Remedies, [1975] SPECIAL LECTURES L.S.U.C. 255.
8 See Rathwell v. Rathwell, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436, [1978] 2 W.W.R. 101,83 D.L.R.
(3d) 289. See also McCamus and Taman, Rathwell v. Rathwell: Matrimonial Property.
Resulting and Constructive Trusts, 16 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 741 (1978).
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law at least,9 merely another instance of the application of the unjust
enrichment principle.
As it may be considered doubtful that restitutionary liability rules are
likely to have much impact in shaping the conduct of human affairs, the
unjust enrichment rationale may provide a more secure foundation for the
obligation imposed in the necessitous intervention cases than does the notion
that recovery will encourage intervention of this kind." ° The moral
sentiment captured by the unjust enrichment principle is simply that, as a
general rule, it is perceived to be unjust that one part) should gain a windfall
benefit at another's expense. unless a gift was intended.' The hopeful
thought that the granting of restitutionary relief might encourage altruism
may provide additional support for the imposition of liability, but the unjust
enrichment principle will be satisfied merely by the existence of an
unintended "free ride".
The earlier reluctance of the courts to grant relief may have found its
inspiration in the supposed general hostility of English la%%, to recovery for
benefits conferred in the absence of request. As Bow en L.J. said in his
oft-quoted dictum in Falcke's case. "Liabilities are not to be forced upon
people behind their backs any more than you can confer a benefit upon a
man against his will." 12 As others' 3 have pointed out, how, ever, the extent
to which the common law has acted on this sentiment is capable of
exaggeration. Indeed, the necessitous intervention case law offers
compelling evidence that English courts would, in appropriate cases, order
compensation for the value of benefits conferred. even though the recipient
9 In contrast to the Canadian position. English la%% has not yet clearly adopted the
unjust enrichment principle as the juristic basis for restitutionary claims. See generally
GOFF AND JONES. supra note 6.
"
0On the somewhat related question as to whether "Good Samaritan" statutes are
likely to have a positive influence in encouraging altruism, some authors have expressed
optimism. See Dawson, Rewards for the Rescue of Human Life'?. in XXTiI CENTtRY
COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LA\w 142 (K. Nadelmann et al. eds. 1961); Gray and
Sharpe. Doctors, Samaritans and the Accident Victim. I I OsGOODI- HAIt L.J I (1973).
" Thus. Dickson J.. in applying the principle in the context of matrimonial property
disputes. said:
As a matter of principle, the court \%ill not allo\, any man unjustly to
appropriate to himself the value earned by the labours of another. That
principle is not defeated by the existence of a matrimonial relationship bet%,een
the parties: but. for the principle to succeed, the facts must display an
enrichment, a corresponding deprivation, and the absence of any juristic reason
- such as a contract or disposition of law - for the enrichment.
Rathwell v. Rathwell. supra note 8. at 455. 119781 2 W.W.R. at 113-14. 83 D.L.R. (3d) at
306. And see McCamus. The Self-Serving Intermeddler amid the biii of Restituton. 16
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 515. at 522-23 (1978).
'2 Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co.. 34 Ch. D. 234. at 248. 56 L.J. Ch. 707. at
713 (C.A. 1886). Falcke's case. it should be noted, is not a case of necessitous
intervention but rather that of a claim brought by one ,ho. in pursuit of his ()%%n interest.
incidentally confers a benefit on another. For discussion of this problem generally. and
Falcke's case particularly. see McCamus. stupra note II.
" See especially Birks. Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Lit. 24 C L'RRE N T Lt-(;
PROB. 110 (1971).
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had neither requested them nor acquiesced in their supply in the knowledge
that compensation was expected. What has been lacking in the English
jurisprudence on this point, however, is a clearly articulated basis for
distinguishing cases in which relief is warranted from those in which it is
not. One of the great contributions of modem restitutionary theory, first
stated systematically in the American Restatement of Restitution, " has been
to provide an analytical device well suited to this task.
The fixation of at least some English courts on the notion of request as
a critical factor may be explained, in part, by the ascendancy in English law
of what is often referred to as the "implied contract" theory of restitutionary
obligation. "5 In the absence of an alternative theoretical explanation for the
imposition of restitutionary duties, it was commonly assumed that liability
would be imposed only where a contractual duty to pay could be implied in
the circumstances of the particular case. Hence, the term "quasi-contract".
In the absence of a request, or at least an acceptance of the benefit in the
knowledge that payment was expected (a "free acceptance"), it may have
appeared difficult to imply that a contractual duty to pay had been assumed.
Although the evident artificiality of this implied contract doctrine has
occasionally been noted with disfavour by English judges,' 6 it has not yet
been completely exorcised from English restitutionary law in the way that it
has been from American1 7 and Canadian doctrine. 18 In the latter
jurisdictions, it is clearly recognized that restitutionary obligations are not
premised on voluntarily assumed contractual obligations which can be
inferred from the circumstances, but rather are obligations imposed by law
in order to prevent an unjust enrichment.
The desire to find evidence of an express or implied request cannot,
however, be simply dismissed as a misguided attempt to force restitutionary
doctrine into the Procrustean bed of contractual theory. Two concerns of a
less scholastic nature also appear to underlie the hesitation to reward
unrequested intervention. First, there appears to be some concern that a rule
permitting recovery might encourage meddlesome intervention in another's
affairs by persons who are acting malevolently or are imposing themselves
on an individual who is, or may be, an unwilling beneficiary. '9 Secondly, it
may be considered unfair, as a general matter, to force individuals to pay for
benefits which they did not freely choose. 2 0 To allow recovery would offend
a value, which is perhaps strongly held, that individuals ought generally to
14Supra note 4.
5 See generally GOFF AND JONES, supra note 6, at 5-11.
6 See, e.g., Craven-Ellis v. Canons, Ltd., [1936] 2 K.B. 403, 105 L.J.K.B. 767
(C.A.);In re Rhodes, 44 Ch. D. 94, 59 L.J. Ch. 298 (C.A. 1890) (considered within. see
pp. 312-14, infra).
17 See materials cited note 4 supra.
" See materials cited note 7 supra.
'
9 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. BI. 254, at 259, 126 E.R. 536, at 539
(C.P. 1793) (per Eyre C.J.).2
°See, e.g., Leigh v. Dickeson, 15 Q.B.D. 60, 52 L.T. 790 (C.A. 1884). And see
generally McCamus, supra note 11, at 519-22.
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be free to invest their assets as they see fit. The first concern relates to
obnoxious conduct on the part of the intervenor: the second relates to the
recipient's freedom of choice. In cases where a request or free acceptance
can be found, it is obvious that both of these concerns are met. Both the
intervenor and the form of the benefit have been freely chosen by the
defendant. As suggested above. however, the use of request as a device for
identifying cases in which recovery will be granted is not satisfactory. A
rule based on request would fail us in at least two distinct senses. First. it
could not explain the results of the decided cases. In particular, it could not
account for the results in the necessitous intervention case law considered
within. Secondly. a rule which denied recovery in all cases but those in
which the benefits had been requested or freely accepted would go further
than is necessary to meet the two concerns articulated above. There will be
many cases - and the necessitous intervention cases are prominent among
these - where good faith intervention which is consistent with the
recipient's concern to avoid investment in unwanted benefits is not
accompanied by a request or free acceptance.
A more satisfactory analysis is offered by modern restitutionary
doctrine. The general principles of the law of restitution direct us to consider
both of these concerns more explicitly than would a rule premised on request
or free acceptance. First. the Restatement sets forth as a general limitation
on the right to recovery that it will be denied to one who has intervened
officiouslY. 2 1 Officious conduct is "interference in the affairs of others not
justified by the circumstances under which the interference takes place." -22
Meddlesome intervention is thus attacked directly by the officiousness
limitation rather than indirectly and inadequately through the use of a
request requirement. Secondly. restitutionary recover), is premised on a
finding that the defendant has received a genuine benefit."3 Judicious use of
this concept will permit us to distinguish unrequested interventions which
are truly of value to the defendant from those unwanted and irrecoverable
benefits which he would not. if given an opportunity. have freely chosen.
In short, the concerns which appear to underlie the attitude of the
common law typified by Bowen L.J.'s colourful invocation of the
importance of request, are more directly and precisely addressed by the
restitutionary concepts of officiousness and benefit. These concerns can be
translated into the terms of modern restitutionary analysis in the following
manner. If recovery is allowed for unrequested benefits, will officious
intervention not be encouraged'? Will the recipient not be forced to invest in
benefits which he did not freely choose and which may not, therefore,
constitute a genuine benefit to him'? For purposes of the present discussion.
however, we may note that both of these objections lose much of their force
in the context of cases of necessitous intervention. One who intervenes
helpfully in an emergency is probably not behaving officiously. If the
21 See RESTITUTION. supra note 4. at s. 2.
2 2 Id. at s. 2. Comment a.
23Id. at s. I. And see McCamus. supra note II. at 519-22
19791
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intervention is officious, of course, recovery should be denied. Further,
where the benefit supplied is one for which there is an immediate need, it
will clearly constitute a benefit. Payment for its value may be seen as an
expenditure which circumstances forced on the recipient rather than as an
offensive intrusion on his freedom of choice by the intervenor. In the normal
case, then, necessitous intervention will properly be characterized as the
unofficious conferral of a genuine benefit. Accordingly, if the unjust
enrichment analysis does indeed offer an explanation for the general outline
of the existing case law,"4 it should occasion no surprise that the courts do,
in fact, often grant recovery in cases of necessitous intervention, even
though the intervenor has not acted upon a request. So too, we should not be
surprised if, on occasion, we find in the case law what now appear to be
anomalous authorities denying relief on the basis that the intervention in
question was uninvited.
Apart from the concern with the element of request, it may be that a
secondary consideration underlying the apparent reluctance of the common
law to adopt a general principle of necessitous intervention may rest in the
moral sentiment, rarely expressed in the case law, that virtue is or ought to
be its own reward.1 5 At least one judge has suggested, tentatively, that any
more tangible reward should not be compelled by law. In Nicholson v.
Chapman, 6 Eyre C.J. questioned whether "it is better for the public that
these voluntary acts of benevolence from one man to another, which are
charities and moral duties, but not legal duties, should depend altogether for
their reward upon the moral duty of gratitude." 27 Views of this kind are still
reflected in the modern law to the extent that recovery is not allowed in cases
where the intervenor has acted with a gratuitous intent. As a more general
matter, however, the reluctance of the courts to reward unrequested
intervention has, in this context, yielded to the rationales supporting
recovery for the value of benefits conferred by the altruistic intervenor.
Though recognition of the necessitous intervention principle may now
draw support from recent developments in restitutionary law, the growth of
a body of law permitting recovery in specific instances of necessitous
intervention substantially antedates the modern adoption of the unjust
enrichment principle. One of the important sources of these rules is found in
the evolution, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, of the
doctrine of agency of necessity. As in other areas of restitutionary law,
however, the method of legal reasoning used to bring relief to the plaintiff
was to strain established categories of legal obligation and develop rather
artificial explanations for the imposition of liability in situations which can
24 This would be one, but only one, of the criteria by which the success of the unjust
enrichment principle as an organizing principle for this area of the law should be judged.
For a stimulating and useful account of the role of legal conceptual schemes generally, and
of the unjust enrichment principle in particular, see Samek, Unjust Enrichment.
Quasi-contract and Restitution, 47 CAN B. REv. I (1969).
25See Allen, Legal Duties, 40 YALE L.J. 331, at 373-77 (1931).
26 Supra note 19.27 Id.
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now be more felicitously analyzed as instances of unjust enrichment. Thus
the doctrine of agency of necessity. normally rooted in a pre-existing
consensual relationship between the parties, was extended by the courts to
capture cases of necessitous intervention which cannot realistically be linked
to an express or tacit consensus.
Before turning to consider the various instances of necessitous
intervention recognized in the case law, the central features of the agency of
necessity doctrine will be reviewed in an attempt to isolate its proper
function and to distinguish from it the operation of the necessitous
intervention principle.
II. AGENCY OF NECESSIT
2 1
The origins of this doctrine are found in a series of early nineteenth
century cases holding that the master of a ship, acting in response to an
emergency, had the authority, indeed the duty, to take reasonable steps to
protect the ship, its crew, passengers and cargo. 9 Provided that the master
acted prudently and that it was impracticable for him to obtain appropriate
instructions from the owner of the ship or cargo. the master would be
entitled to reimbursement from the owner for the expenses incurred by him
in carrying out these measures.30 Obviously such a rule meets the
convenience of the owners. 3 ' Further, in the case of conduct undertaken on
behalf of the owner of the ship. it could reasonably be assumed by either
party that such interventions are authorized, albeit tacitly, by the terms of
the master's employment. 32
The doctrine was later extended, notwithstanding the existence of
some judicial opinion to the contrary. 33 to cover agents carrying out
assignments for their principals on land. In Great Northern Railway v.
Swaffield, 31 for example, a carrier who had placed a horse with a livery
2 See generally Williston. supra note 3: G. FRIDNIAN. THE LI. of AGEN( Y. oh. 12
(4th ed. 1976); R. POW.ELL. THE LAX\ OF AGENCY ch. 9 (2d ed. 1961); S. STOIJAR. TilE
LAW OF AGENCY ch. 7 (1961).
2-Notara v. Henderson. L.R. 7 Q.B. 225. 41 L.J.Q.B. 158 (Ex. Ch. 1872)
(statement of master's dut
" 
to take affirmative steps to preserve deteriorating cargo);
Robertson v. Carruthers. 2 Stark. 571. 171 E.R. 739 (C.P. 1819) (sale of ship so damaged
as not to be worth repairing): The Gratitudine. 3 C. Rob. 240. 165 E.R. 450 (H.C. of
Adm. 1801) (Hypothecation of cargo for necessary repairs to ship). See generally
CARVER'S CARRIAGE BY SEA 647 et seq. (12th ed. R. Colinvaux 1971).
"
0 Cargo ex Agros, L.R. 5 P.C. 134, 28 L.T. 745 (1873).
31 Id. at 165, 28 L.T. at 756 (per Sir Montague Smith).
'2 Though this point is rarely made explicit in the case la%, it is evident that this must
be so. Otherwise, of course, it would be rather draconian to impose a ht" to act The
implied authority to act in an emergency may thus be vie%,ed as an extension to emergency
situations of the general rule that the agent is presumed to have authority to perform an), act
which is necessary for and incidental to the effective execution of expressl) authorized
conduct. See Williston. supra note 3. at 494.3 3 See Hawtayne v. Bourne. 7 M. & W. 595. at 599 (per Parke, B.). 600 (per
Alderson B.). 10 L.J. Exch. 224. at 226 (1841): Gv illiam v. T%%ist. [18951 2 Q.B. 84. at
87, 64 L.J.Q.B. 474. at 478 (C.A.) (per Lord Esher).
3' L.R. 9 Ex. 132.43 L.J. Exch. 89 (1874).
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stable keeper when it was not met at its destination was held entitled to
recover the cost of providing this necessary service. Similarly, it has been
held that the employees of a railway may contract on their principal's
behalf for necessary medical services for passengers injured in an
accident. 35  Further, it is established that a carrier may dispose of
perishable goods in an emergency 36 and there have been suggestions that
this rule may be extended more generally to permit bailees in possession of
another's goods to dispose of them in such circumstances. 37
In cases where an existing agent assumes powers which would
otherwise be beyond the scope of his authority in order to meet an
emergency, the doctrine may operate merely as a reasoned elaboration of
the terms of the agency relationship.38 Indeed, in such cases, the four
conditions which are commonly said to be a prerequisite to the doctrine's
application3" may be viewed more straightforwardly as the essential
features of an implied term which would reasonably be read into the
agency agreement as being consistent with the presumed intent of the
parties. The four conditions are the following:
(i) "it must be practically impossible to get the [principal's] instruction in
time as to what shall be done"; 4"
(ii) it must have been necessary for the agent to act as he did, though as one
judge explained, 4 necessity ought not to be interpreted here as an
35 Langan v. Great W. Ry., 30 L.T. 173 (Ex. Ch. 1873); Walker v. Great W. Ry..
L.R. 2 Ex. 228, 36 L.J. Exch. 123 (1867).
36See Springerv. Great W. Ry., [1921] 1 K.B. 257, [1920] All E.R. Rep. 361 (C.A.
1920); Sims & Co. v. Midland Ry., [1913] 1 K.B. 103, 82 L.J.K.B. 67 (C.A. 1912).
37 Coldman v. Hill, [1919] I K.B. 443, at 456, 120 L.T. 412, at 416 (C.A. 1918)
(per Scrutton L.J.). And see Sachs v. Miklos, [1948] 2 K.B. 23, [1948] I All E.R. 67
(C.A. 1947); Munro v. Willmott, [1949] I K.B. 295, [1948] 2 All E.R. 983 (1948)
(holding, in each case, that no emergency has been established). But see further pp.
315-20, infra.
38 The same may be said of certain bailments though this is, perhaps, less probable as
the bailee's mandate is likely to be rather limited, and it may be a largely fictional exercise
to imply emergency powers. See BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY S. 1I. 10 (3d ed. W.
Raushenbush 1975). Similarly, an authority to act in an emergency may, in appropriate
circumstances, be implied in the context of a master-servant relationship. See Poland v.
John Parr & Sons, [1927] 1 K.B. 236, 96 L.J.K.B. 152 (C.A. 1926). The question of
whether the master-servant relationship is to be considered as distinct from or rather as an
instance of the agency relationship is a difficult one. See POWELL, supra note 28, at 7-24.
For present purposes, however, the distinction is immaterial inasmuch as the doctrine of
agency of necessity has been applied to both "agents" and "servants".39 See generally Williston, supra note 3, at 497-501; GOFF AND JONES, supra note 6.
at 266-67. And see POWELL, supra note 28, at 429-32.
"'Sims & Co. v. Midland Ry., supra note 36, at 112, 82 L.J.K.B. at 71 (per
Scrutton J.) (semble). And see Bruton v. Regina City Policeman's Ass'n. [19451 2
W.W.R. 273, at 295 (Sask. C.A.) (per Martin C.J.); The Margaret Mitchell. Swab. 382.
166 E.R. 1174 (H.C. of Adm. 1858); Tetley & Co. v. British Trade Corp.. 10 L.L. Rep.
678 (K.B. 1922).
11 Australasian Steam Navigation Co. v. Morse, L.R. 4 P.C. 222, at 230. 27 L.T.
357, at 359 (1872) (per Sir Montague Smith). And see Bank of New S. Wales v. Owston,
4 App. Cas. 270, at 290 (P.C. 1879), 48 L.J.P.C. 25, at 34 (per Sir Montague Smith).
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"irresistable compelling power" but rather as a situation of emergenc)
which casts a duty on the agent to act in his principal's best interests; 2
(iii) the agent must have acted "bona fide in the interests of the parties
concerned" ;43
(iv) the action taken must have been reasonable or prudent in the cir-
cumstances. 41
Again, when the doctrine is applied in the context of an existing agency
relationship, the substance of the matter will usually be that the parties are
presumed, and reasonably so, to have tacitly agreed that if an unforeseen
emergency should arise, the agent, being unable to communicate with the
principal, would be empowered to act prudently in the latter's best
interests. 45 An agent faced with such circumstances would reasonably
assume that he had such authority.
Further, it should be noted that in the cases of pre-existing agency, the
emergency power of the agent of necessity is a power of a true agent.
Thus, when exercised, it will have the usual consequences incidental to the
exercise of an agent's powers. The agent may bind his principal in contract
to a third party.4 6 The principal may be rendered vicariously liable in tort
for actions taken in the emergency. 47 The agent may be able to delegate his
authority to act with the consequence that the principal may be exposed to
vicarious liability for the tortious acts of the delegate. 48 The agent. on the
other hand, not being a mere stranger, may have a dtuty to act on his
principal's behalf. 49
There are two further consequences which flow from the principal-
agent relationship which are not, however, exclusive to it. First, and more
importantly for present purposes, the agent is entitled to reimbursement
42 See also John Koch. Ltd. v. C. & H. Prods. Ltd.. 119561 2 Lloyd's Rep. 59, at 65
(C.A.) (per Singleton L.J.): Phelps. James & Co. v. Hill, 118911 1 Q.B. 605. at 610, 60
L.J.Q.B. 382. at 384 (C.A.) (per Lindley L.J.).
43 Prager v. Blatspiel. Stamp & Heacock. Ltd.. [19241 1 K.B. 566. at 572. 93
L.J.K.B. 410, at 414 (per McCardie J.). See also Nova Scotia Marine Ins. Co. v L.P
Churchill & Co.. 26 S.C.R. 65 (1896): Tronson v. Dent. 8 Moo. P.C. 419, 14 E.R 159
(1853).
4 Broom v. Hall. 7 C.B.. N.S. 503. 141 E.R. 911 (1859).
" Thus, the American rule is stated in the follow ing terms:
Unless otherwise agreed. if after authorization is given, an unforeseen situation
arises for which the terms of the authorization make no provision and tt is
impracticable for the agent to communicate with the principal, he is authorized
to do what he reasonably believes to be necessary in order to prevent
substantial loss to the principal with respect to the interests committed to his
charge.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY s. 47 (1958). See also J. SoR'. ACiEN( Y ss.
141-42 (9th ed. 1882).46 See, e.g., Walker v. Great W. Ry.. supra note 35: Langan v. Great W. Ry.. supra
note 35; Ledwell v. Charlottetown Light & Pover Co.. 13 E.L.R. 225 (P.E.1. C.A. 1913).
47 Gwilliam v. Twist. [ 18951 1 Q.B. 557. 64 L.J.Q.B. 474. rev'd on the basis of lack
of necessity, supra note 33. But cf. Hollidge v. Duncan. 199 Mass. 121, 85 N.E. 186
(1908) (where Gwilliarn v. Twist distinguished).
48 Gwilliam v. Twist. supra note 47.49 See, e.g.. Cargo ex Argos. supra note 30; Langan v. Great W. RN.. supra note 35
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from his principal. Secondly, conduct of the agent which would otherwise
be considered tortious is, by virtue of being authorized, excused. As will
be seen, the courts have applied similar rules of reimbursement and
excuse, without relying on agency of necessity, to non-agents who have
responded to another's emergency. It should be noted that the right to
reimbursement 5" is perhaps better recognized in this context than the tort
privilege attaching to necessitous intervention. 5' A clearly recognized
juristic basis for applying these rules to non-agents has, however, been
slow to develop. Accordingly, the courts have often drawn on an extended
application of agency of necessity doctrine to supply a doctrinal basis for
the importing of these two liability rules into cases of necessitous
intervention by non-agents.
This phenomenon may be observed in the earliest stages of the
doctrine's development. Indeed, Powell has suggested 52 that this is true
even of the shipmasters' cases. In Powell's view, the shipmaster who acts
in an emergency on behalf of the owner of cargo is probably not acting in
the course of an existing agency relationship with the cargo owner. The
shipmaster's principal is the owner of the ship. It may be, however, that
the results in many of these cases rest on terms genuinely implied in the
charterparty agreement. 53 More clearly artificial applications of the
doctrine are evident in its use by the courts to provide a theoretical basis for
the well-established right of indemnification of one who voluntarily
discharges another's obligation on a negotiable instrument as an acceptor
for honour 54 and for the rule enabling a deserted wife to pledge her
husband's credit. 5 In neither instance does the situation lend itself to the
inference of an implied power to deal with emergencies arising from the
circumstances of a pre-existing agency relationship. The acceptor for
honour may be a complete stranger to his alleged principal. The
characterization of the relationship of separated spouses as that of principal
and agent is an obvious fiction. 56
5 See generally text accompanying notes 73 et seq., infra.
5 See generally J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 92-96 (5th ed. 1977); A. LINDIN.
CANADIAN TORT LAW 70-72 (1977). And see further text accompanying notes 126-28,
infra.
52 POWELL, supra note 28, at 414. See also FRIDMAN,. supra note 28. at 120.
5 Although the major uses of the doctrine in this context are: (i) to excuse the
principal, the shipowner, from liability for what would otherwise be tortious conduct of his
agent and (ii) to enable the shipowner who has, through the actions of his agent, incurred
expense to recover therefor, the master's right to recovery has also been suggested. See
Hingston v. Wendt, I Q.B. 367, at 370, 34 L.T. 181, at 182 (1876) (per Blackburn J.). It
is possible that the results in cases (i) and (ii) may often be explained, without artificiality,
on the basis that the charterparty tacitly confers emergency powers on the shipowner and
permits delegation of their exercise to the master. The master's right of recovery does not.
however, yield easily to this analysis.
54 See Hawtayne v. Bourne, supra note 33. And see further text accompanying notes
135-39, infra.
55 See, e.g., thedictum of Lush J. in Eastland v. Burchell, 3 Q.B.D. 432, at 436, 417
L.J.Q.B. 500, at 502 (1878). And see further text accompanying notes 169-74, infra.
51 J.S. Ewart, in reviewing an edition of ANSON ON CONTRACT in which the agency
of necessity rationale was accepted unquestioningly, sarcastically observed:
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More subtle departures from what might be termed the true agency
model may also be observed. A Canadian case. Hastings v. Village of
Semans,5 r offers a useful illustration. A woman seriously injured in an
accident had been taken in the middle of the night to the office of a
physician, one Dr. Hotham. Dr. Hotham put a temporary cast on her leg
and took her to a private hospital in a nearby village. Ultimately the patient
was found to be unable to pay and a claim was brought by the hospital
against a second village in which she resided. Recovery was allowed on
the following basis. As the patient was an indigent resident of the
defendant village, the latter had a statutory duty to provide her with
medical attendance and treatment. Further, and rather fortuitously, as Dr.
Hotham was the defendant's medical officer, he was empowered as an
agent of necessity to bring the patient to the plaintiff hospital for
treatment. The defendant was therefore liable, presumably in contract, to
the plaintiff hospital.
Though the imposition of liability for the services rendered in this
case was quite appropriate, the reasoning of the court is questionable. It
seems very doubtful that an emergency power to act on the municipality's
behalf with respect to indigents would be viewed by the municipality as an
incident of the medical health officer's role. 5" Further, the report of the
decision does not indicate any evidence to suggest that Dr. Hotham viewed
himself as acting in the course of his duties as medical health officer at the
time in question. A preferable explanation for the result, it is suggested, is
that the plaintiff unofficiously benefited the defendant by fulfilling its
statutory obligation to the indigent. Indeed, on this same basis, Dr.
Hotham would be entitled to reimbursement from the village for the value
of rendered services which fell outside his responsibilities as medical
health officer 59 and which, similarly. conferred a benefit on the village by
fulfilling its statutory duty.
In short then, a clear distinction has not been drawn in the case law
between cases of genuinely inferred powers of an agent to act in an
emergency, and cases of necessitous intervention. The reason for this is
easily discerned. In the absence of clear recognition of a principle of
I presume that the "necessity- is that of ascertaining some legal basis upon
which to found liability: No man can be made liable for \%hat neither he nor his
agent orders: the deserted wife was not an agent: therefore - What? -
therefore the fact must be changed. and the ',ife must have been an agent Can
anything be more absurd?
33 HARV. L. REv. 626. at 627 (1920). See generally Po\ -i1i . supra note 28. at 425-28.
Although agency of necessity is frequently adverted to in the Canadian authorites, this is
not invariably so. See, e.g.. Griffith v. Paterson. 20 Grant 615 (1873)
57 [1946] 3 W.W.R. 449. 1194614 D.L.R. 695 (Sask. C.A.)
" Dr. Hotham's duties were loosely defined to require him "" 'to look after the health
of the people, infectious diseases particularly' -. Id. at 452. 119461 4 D.L.R. at 697
59 If Dr. Hotham's duties %%ere to include direct medical services to indigents
(whether on a fee for service or some other basis) it is most improbable that this fact .%ould
not have been proven at trial in support of the plaintiff's reliance on the agency of necessity
doctrine.
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unjust enrichment upon which liability could be premised, it became
necessary to strain the limits of orthodox agency theory to capture the
necessitous intervention cases. Perhaps the most expansive view of the
role of the agency of necessity doctrine was that suggested by McCardie J.
in his well-known dictum in Prager v. Blatspiel, Stamp & Heacock, Ltd. 60
McCardie J. indicated that the doctrine could apply to a purchasing agent
who might in war-time conditions find it necessary to resell goods
originally purchased for his principal, and went on to say:
[T]here is nothing in the existing decisions which confines the agency of
necessity to carriers whether by land or sea, or to the acceptors of bills of
exchange. The basic principle I think is a broad and useful one. It lies at the
root of the various classes of cases of which the carrier decisions are merely an
illustration. 61
Though it is far from clear that McCardie J. would have extended the
doctrine to cover all cases of necessitous intervention, there is nothing in
the judgment to suggest that the doctrine should be limited to cases where
emergency powers could be implied into an existing agency agreement. As
noted previously, the acceptor for honour would not meet this criterion and
indeed, in Prager's case itself, the agency agreement would presumably
have been nullified by the occupation of the principal's country of
residence by enemy forces. The effect of the war on the agency agreement
was not, however, expressly considered by McCardie J. in his judgment.
Other judges have attempted to restrict the scope of the doctrine to
cases of pre-existing agency in which an implied power to act can, without
artificiality, be implied. In Jebara v. Ottoman Bank6" for example,
Scrutton L.J. responded to McCardie J.'s dictum in the following terms:
The expansion desired by McCardie J. becomes less difficult when the agent of
necessity develops from an original and subsisting agency, and only applies
itself to unforeseen events not provided for in the original contract .... But
the position seems quite different when there is no pre-existing agency as in the
case of a finder of perishable chattels or animals, and still more difficult when
there is a pre-existing agency, but it has become illegal and void by reason of
war, and the same reason will apply to invalidate any implied agency of
necessity. 63
It is not yet clearly established, however, whether these remarks offer an
authoritative pronouncement on the proper scope of the doctrine and
effectively confine what appears to be the more broadly conceived role
envisaged for it by McCardie J.
The logic of the more restrictive view espoused by Scrutton L.J.
appears particularly compelling when it is recalled that the actions of an
agent of necessity may result in imposition of contractual and lortious
6 Supra note 43.
6 Id. at 570, 93 L.J.K.B. at 413.
62 [1927] 2 K.B. 254, 96 L.J.K.B. 581 (C.A.), rev'd on another ground, [19281
A.C. 269 (H.L.).
'Id. at 271, 96 L.J.K.B. at 588.
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liability on the principal. To permit such consequences to flow from the
actions of strangers to the principal would be inconsistent with the theory
of obligation underlying these two branches of the law. On the other hand,
an argument can be made against this narrow interpretation of the agency
of necessity doctrine. The virtue of the approach advocated by
McCardie J. is that it does provide a rule dressed in familiar terminological
garb which will impose liability in at least some cases of necessitous
intervention and this is, as will be seen, a liability which the courts have, in
a considerable range of situations, been prepared to impose. True, the
rationale for imposing liability in these cases is not an agency rationale. It
is obviously a matter of rewarding unofficious intervention. If, however,
emphasis is placed on the four conditions of the doctrine's application,'
recovery will be precluded where the intervention has been officious or
imprudent. It might then be argued that without gross distortion of the
doctrine, agency of necessity can perform serviceably as a framework of
analysis for cases of necessitous intervention. To distinguish this
application of the doctrine and avoid confusion with true cases of implied
agency powers, one might refer to it as "quasi-agency"."
There are, however, a number of difficulties inherent in this
expansive use of agency doctrine. First, in cases which approach the
dividing line between true agency and quasi-agency, confusion concerning
the rationale underlying relief may lead to the attribution of agency
consequences to the conduct of persons who are not, in reality, agents of
the principal. Secondly, as the facts of a particular case stray farther away
from the true agency model, the agency roots of the liability rules may
provoke unduly restrictive interpretations of their reach. This is especially
so in cases of intervention by strangers6 6 but this problem may also arise in
cases of pre-existing agency relationships. 67 Finally, there are a number of
instances of necessitous intervention in which liability has traditionally
been imposed without reference to the agency of necessity doctrine." It is
analytically cumbersome to preserve a distinction between cases of
necessitous intervention which are to be explained as instances of
64See text accompanying notes 38-44. supra.
61 A phrase coined by Ewart. See Ewart. supra note 56. at 627. See also Williston,
supra note 3, at 501-02 (applying the phrase to the deserted wife cases).
11 Consider, for example. the cases on preservation of property considered within.
See pp. 315-20, infra. And see Jebara v. Ottoman Bank, supra note 62.67 See, e.g., Scrutton L.J.'s criticism of Prager's case in Jebara v. Ottoman Bank,
supra note 63. Cf. Re Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschesky), 119521 1 All
E.R. 1269, 119521 W.N. 151 (Ch.) (recovery not allowed for advantageous legal services
rendered for bank after its dissolution but before winding up. on the basis that the principal
had ceased to exist), and contrast the American case law allowing recovery for services
rendered to an estate prior to appointment of a personal representative, referred to in notes
115-17. infra.
"
8 See, e.g., In re Rhodes, supra note 16 (necessaries supplied to a mental
incompetent), considered at pp. 312-14, infra. Ambrose v. Kerrison, 10 C.B. 776, 138
E.R. 307 (C.P. 1851) (indemnification for burial expenses) considered at pp. 322-24.
infra.
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quasi-agency and a further group which must be regarded merely as
aberrations or, as is often suggested, as sporadic and unrelated importa-
tions into the common law of the civilian concept of negotiorum gestio. ""
An analytical framework which would avoid these difficulties and
therefore reduce the risk of inconsistent and anomalous decisions, would
distinguish clearly between, on the one hand, cases of genuinely implied
authority and, on the other, cases of necessitous intervention. The latter
category would consist of interventions either by strangers or by agents
acting in excess of any implied authority to act which could realistically be
inferred from the circumstances. This approach has been adopted in
American law. The use of agency doctrine is restricted to cases of implied
authority7" and from these are distinguished cases of necessitous interven-
tion which are said to give rise to restitutional rights premised on the
general principle of unjust enrichment. 7"
The adoption by Canadian courts of the unjust enrichment principle as
the underlying rationale of so-called quasi-contractual liability72 permits a
similar clarification of the theoretical foundations of these two related but
distinct areas of our private law. When freed in this way from contrived
connections to agency doctrine, the case law on necessitous intervention,
to which we now turn, may be seen to yield a relatively coherent pattern of
liability rules which emphasize a theme common to other areas of the
modern law of restitution -the awarding of recovery to intervenors whose
conduct is unofficious and has the effect of conferring a genuine benefit on
the recipient.
III. NECESSITOUS INTERVENTION
In this section, an account is given of instances of liability imposed
for the value of benefits conferred in necessitous circumstances which
cannot be rationalized on the basis of agency doctrines. Two categories of
liability may be distinguished: first, the liability of the person in need upon
whom the benefit has been directly conferred; secondly, the liability of a
third party whose duty to respond to another's emergency has been
fulfilled by the intervenor.
69 See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 28, at 416-25; Marasinghe, The Place of
Negotiorum Gestio in English Law, 8 OTTAWA L. REv. 573 (1976).
71See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 45.
7 1 Id. at s. 14 1:
A person who has a power created by law to subject another to liability for the
protection of the other's person or property or for the performance of the
other's obligations is not an agent but is the holder of a power to create
restitutional rights. (emphasis added).
And see RESTITUTION, supra note 4, at ss. 112-17, especially s. 117( 1).71See text accompanying note 7, supra.
[Vol. I11:297
Restitution: The Altruistic hiterineddler
A. Intervention to Protect the Life, Health, Property or Credit of Another
1. Preservation of Life or Health
The provision of necessary medical or other rescue services to a
person whose health or safety is in immediate peril presents a strong case
for the granting of recovery. 73 The provision of such services would
normally be considered a benefit. And normally, interventions in such
circumstances would be considered unofficious. Where the recipient of
such services is unconscious or so irrational as to be unable to contract for
their supply, it is evident that a successful claim for reimbursement or
remuneration could only be explained in terms of restitutionary princi-
ples. 4 In Matheson v. Smile., 71 the Manitoba Court of Appeal awarded
recovery to a surgeon for attending a man who had attempted suicide.
Robson J.A. commented in part:
Smiley was conscious and did say something to plaintiff but it is clear that he
was in such an extreme condition that no %,ords of his then should be construed
as a request for the plaintiff's services or as an acquiescence in their being
rendered on a contractual footing .... I think it is not %, ithin reason that even
in such circumstances as are revealed here a person in such a plight should
simply be allowed to die without an effort being made... to secure his
recovery .... And surely the person to pay should be the person for %%hose
benefit the service is rendered....
The common law takes notice of such emergencies and declares to be a
duty what is almost invariably done upon human impulse ",
The public interest in encouraging interventions of this kind is thus offered
as a basis for overriding our general reluctance to award recovery for the
value of unrequested services. No doubt a similar justification underlies
the rule of tort law that a surgeon is not liable in tort for exceeding his
patient's instructions in the course of an operation where he has, in (he face
of an unanticipated emergency. taken steps to preserve the patient's life or
health. 7
The fact that the services rendered in Matheson's case are ultimately
unavailing is apparently not considered relevant. Success in the rescue
effort is not a condition of recovery presumably for the reason that the
73 See RESTITUTION. supra note 4. at s. 116.74 See Matheson v. Smiley. 40 Man. R. 247. 119321 2 D.L.R. 787 (C.A.). See also
Cotnam v. Wisdom. 83 Ark. 601. 104 S.W. 164 (1907) (recover\ for services rendered b,
surgeon to an unconscious patient). Where the recipient is rational. ho%,ever. his vies
would normally prevail. It may be. ho%,ever. that Canadian courts have been too zealous
in applying this principle. In Mulloy v. Hop Sang. 119351 I W.W.R. 714 (Alta. C A.), a
claim for the value of medical services rendered by a surgeon %%as disallo\,ed as he had
exceeded the patient's instructions. See also Soldiers' Memorial Hosp. v Sanford. 7
M.P.R. 334. [1934] 2 D.L.R. 334 (N.S.S.C.) (disallo\.ine a claim for hospital services
rendered to an injured person. in the custody of police officers. sho had expressed an
understandable preference for being taken to his o%,n home).75Supra note 74.761d. at 249. [1932] 2 D.L.R. at 789.77See Marshall v. Curry. 60 C.C.C. 136. at 152. [19331 3 D.L.R. 260. at 275
(N.S.S.C.) (per Chisholm C.J.).
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defendant would, if rational, have wished that the attempt be made and
would have authorized the expenditure involved.
Recovery would be precluded, of course, if it were established that
the intervenor acted with the intention of making a gift. The fact that the
intervenor was, in supplying the benefit concerned, acting in the course of
his business or profession may be evidence of an intent to charge. 78
Further, it is conceivable that an intervenor may expect reimbursement for
out-of-pocket expenses even though he has no intention to charge for the
value of his services. 79
2. The Supply of Necessaries to Mental Incompetents, Minors and
Drunkards
Even though mental incompetents, drunkards and minors suffer a
general contractual incapacity, they may enter into binding contracts for
the supply of necessaries. 80 Where such agreements are, for some reason,
unenforceable, a restitutionary claim for the value of necessaries which
have actually been supplied will be available on the basis of restitutionary
principles. 81 Situations of this kind are not relevant to the theme of this
paper. Our topic here is a consideration of the extent to which
restitutionary liability is imposed for the value of necessaries supplied
without request. As a general rule, such liability is imposed. Thc
justification for this must rest on the necessitous intervention principle.
(a) Mental Incompetents
It is well established English8" and Canadian13 law that one who,
without being requested to do so, unofficiously supplies necessaries to a
mental incompetent is entitled to recover their value in a restitutionary
claim. Thus in an early case, Williams v. Wentworth, 4 recovery was
allowed against the estate of a mental incompetent for costs incurred by the
plaintiff in petitioning for a commission of lunacy. This was said to be
78 RESTITUTION, supra note 4, at s. 114, Comment c. It has been suggested that
where it is customary to do so, account may be taken of the recipient's ability to pay in
fixing the rate of remuneration. See Matheson v. Smiley, supra note 74. But see Cotnam
v. Wisdom, supra note 74.79 See GOFF AND JONES, supra note 6, at 271-72.80 Id. at 343-64.
81 Id. And see McCamus, Restitution of Benefits Conferred Under Minors'
Contracts, 28 U.N.B.L.J. 89 (1979).
"
2See, e.g., In re Rhodes, supra note 16; Nelson v. Duncombe, 9 Beav. 211, 50
E.R. 323 (Rolls Ct. 1846); Williams v. Wentworth, 5 Beav. 325, 49 E.R. 603 (Rolls Ct.
1842); Wentworth v. Tubb, I Y. & C.C.C. 171, 62 E.R. 840 (V.C. 1841); Howard v. Earl
Digby, 2 Cl. & F. 634, 6 E.R. 1293 (H.C. of Ch. 1834).83See, e.g., Morrow v. Morrow, 47 O.L.R. 222, 52 D.L.R. 628 (C.A. 1920); Re
McKeown, [1962] O.W.N. 142 (H.C.);Re Hilker, 55 O.L.R. 402 (H.C. 1924); East Hants
Municipality v. Embree, [1948] 4 D.L.R. 151 (N.S. Cty. Ct.). And see Samilo v.
Phillips, 69 D.L.R. (2d) 411 (B.C.S.C. 1968), rev'd as to counterclaim 18 D.L.R. (3d)
256n. (B.C.C.A. 1969), rev'd as to counterclaim [1972] S.C.R. 201 (1971).84Supra note 82.
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"money expended for the necessary protection of the person and estate
of the lunatic" 8 and, as such, could be the subject of a valid claim against
the estate. Far from being requested, of course, such benefits may be
conferred over the misguided protests of the recipient.86
That the rationale underlying the rule is restitutionary in nature, as
opposed to being premised on notions of implied contract, cannot be
doubted. In In re Rhodes,8 7 the Court of Appeal rejected the suggestion
that liability ought not to be imposed on a party lacking contractual
capacity. Cotton L.J. said:
[W]henever necessaries are supplied to a person who by reason of disability
cannot himself contract, the law implies an obligation on the part of such
person to pay for such necessaries out of his own property. It is asked, can
there be an implied contract by a person who cannot himself contract in express
terms? The answer is, that what the lass implies on the part of such a person is
an obligation, which has been improperly termed a contract, to repay money
spent in supplying necessaries. "
Similar views were expressed by the other members of the court. 8"
Again, if the benefits were conferred with a gift intention, recovery
would not be allowed. Indeed, it has been said that the intervenor must
establish that he "'intended at the time that he should be repaid". 9 " This
may be a difficult test for friends and relatives who respond to an
emergency without directing much thought to the question of compensa-
tion but who, nonetheless, do not act with a clear intention to make a gift
of the benefit conferred. 9t Though such parties would perhaps not
normally expect remuneration for their own exertions, it may be
reasonable to assume that if they had been asked to address the question of
reimbursement at the time of conferral, they would have articulated an
assumption that they would be reimbursed, if possible, for out-of-pocket
expenses. Accordingly, where such parties honestly profess that they had
no clear thought on the matter at the time of conferral. it is arguably just
that an award for such expenses be made.912 An alternative solution leading
to a similar result would be to accept the suggestion of others 13 that the
85 Id. at 329, 49 E.R. at 605.
' In Williams, the commission was contested but upheld upon the trial of a traverse.
See also Matheson v. Smiley, supra note 74. discussed in accompanying text.
'7 In re Rhodes. supra note 16 (recovery disallowed on other grounds); see further
text accompanying notes 90-94. infra.881d. at 105. 59 L.J. Ch. at 302-03.
"gId. at 107 (per Lindley L.J.), 108 (per Lopes L.J.). 59 L.J. Ch. at 303.9 0 Re Hilker, supra note 83. at 405 (per Rose J.). And see, In re Rhodes. supra note
16.
9' Few intervenors will be aware of their potential restitutionary claim at the time of
conferring the benefit. Those who are so av. are and \%ho expect to rely on this entitlement
will recover. See Re McKeown. supra note 83.
1 Compare the similar suggestion in the McKeown case that reimbursement should
be afforded to parties who act ".under a sense of duty or obligation and not merely
gratuitously". id. at 145.
91 GOFF AND JONES. supra note 6. at 271. 275 (criticizing In re Rhodes).
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onus should be placed on the recipient of the benefit to show that the
supplier had no expectation of reimbursement. A gratuitous intent could,
however, be inferred from circumstantial evidence, as where the
intervenor manifests over a considerable period of time no interest in
repayment. Such were the facts in In re Rhodes. In that case, relatives had
paid part of the cost of maintaining a mentally incompetent woman in an
asylum. The payments were made over a period of many years; no records
were kept of the expenditures and no claim for reimbursement was made
during her lifetime. The court concluded, in the words of Lopes L.J., that
the payments were "bounteous gifts"., 4
(b) Minors
Similarly where an intervenor, being an appropriate person to do so,
confers unrequested but necessary benefits upon a minor, liability on
restitutionary grounds will be imposed. Although such situations may
rarely arise, statements in support of this proposition are to be found in the
case law 95 and, indeed, liability has been imposed on this basis in a few
instances. 96
(c) Drunkards
An intervenor who supplies necessaries to one who is so intoxicated
as to be incapable of rational assent to their supply may also invoke
restitutionary principles."7 Thus recovery has been allowed for expenses
incurred in caring for a man suffering from an attack of delirium tremens
whose conduct had become violent and erratic.9 8 Given the temporary
nature of drunkenness, however, it is unlikely that claims of this kind
would involve necessaries other than emergency medical assistance and
related services.
94Supra note 16, at 108.
95See, e.g., Re J., [1909] I Ch. 574, at 577, 78 L.J. Ch. 348. at 350 (C.A.) (per
Fletcher Moulton L.J.): "In my opinion the position of a lunatic and that of an infant with
regard to necessaries are precisely the same. Both come under the principle laid down
authoritatively by the Court of Appeal in the case in In re Rhodes." And see Pontypridd
Union v. Drew, [19271 1 K.B. 214, at 220, 95 L.J.K.B. 1030, at 1034 (C.A. 1926) (per
Scrutton L.J.).
9 1n re Oberth, 44 Man. R. 357, [1936] 3 W.W.R. 474 (K.B.); In re Clabbon.
[1904] 2 Ch. 465, 73 L.J. Ch. 853. In both cases it may have been that the benefits were
requested by the minor or his parent. If there was such a request in either case. however, it
would have been made on the assumption that the benefits would not have to be paid for.
Liability must therefore be premised on necessitous intervention rather than on the
principles relating to ineffective transactions referred to in text accompanying note 81.
supra.9
rSee Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623, at 626 (per Pollock C.B.). 627 (per
Alderson B.), 153 E.R. 260, at 262 (Ex. Ch. 1845).
" West Ham Union v. Pearson, 62 L.T. 638 (C.A. 1890). It may be that deliriumn
trenens is better viewed as a form of insanity. The defendant here was held not to be a
lunatic and therefore not covered by the Lunacy Acts. He was held liable -simply upon
the common law liability on the part of the defendant to repay the expenses necessarily
incurred for the benefit of the defendant himself". d. at 639 (per Fry L.J.).
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3. Preservation of Property
Necessitous intervention to preserve the property of another has been
less favourably treated than the categories previously considered. The
problem has often arisen in the context of attempts by intervenors to assert
a lien over property which has been saved or protected by their efforts.
Such claims have been consistently rejected." In Nicholson v. Chap-
man,' 00 for example, the defendant had rescued timber belonging to the
plaintiff which had been carried away by the tide. The defendant refused to
give up the timber unless the plaintiff would compensate him for the
services rendered. In response to the plaintiff's claim in trover, the
defendant, arguing for an extension of the rules of maritime law granting a
possessory lien to salvors.101 claimed a lien against the timber. The
owner's claim in trover succeeded. In dismissing the defendant's
argument. Eyre C.J. emphasized that the owner w ould be placed in a very
difficult situation if he were required to tender an uncertain amount in
order to recover his goods. 102 The rules of maritime salvage were
distinguished as being rooted in a policy of encouraging the especially
hazardous undertaking of rescue at sea. 103
The question left at large in Nicholson. and indeed in the subsequent
cases. is whether an intervenor might be entitled to in personam relief on
the basis of necessitous intervention. Eyre C.J. was apparently sympa-
thetic to such a claim:
This is a good office, and meritorious, at least in the moral sense of the %kord.
and certainly intitles the party to some reasonable recompence from the bount%,
if not from the justice of the ovner: and of %.hich. if it v ere refused, a court of
justice would go as far as it could go. to%,ards enforcing the pay ment So it
would if a horse had strayed .... [andl .%as taken up by some good-natured
man and taken care of by him. till at some trouble. and perhaps at some
expence, he had found out the owner. 1U.
Nonetheless. Nicholson has been read as support for the general
proposition that salvage on land must go unre%%arded unless it has been
rendered at the invitation, express or implied, of the o%% ner. lo' And though
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Fenvick. 51 O.L.R. 23.64 D.L.R. 647 (H C 1921); Falcke
v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co.. supra note 12: In re Leslie. 23 Ch. D 552. 52 L.J Ch 762
(1883): Binstead v. Buck, 2 W. BI. 117. 96 E.R. 660 (1777); Nicholson v. Chapman,
supra note 19.
1
°"Supra note 19.
"0I For discussion of which. see generally CARVI:R'S CARRIA6,- iiN St A. %upra note
29. at 791-848: GOFF AND JONES. supra note 6. at 280-93102 Supra note 19.
0 3 Id. at 257. 126 E.R. at 538. See ab.o Falcke v Scottish Imperial Ins Co . 5upra
note 12. at 248-49. 56 L.J. Ch. at 714 (per Bousen L.J.)
'
0 4Supra note 19. at 258. 126 E.R. at 539.
105 See. e.g.. obiter dicta in The Gas Float Whitton No 2. 118951 P 301. at 311.
rev'd [1896] P. 42 (C.A. 1895). aff'd sub non. Wells v. Gas Float Whiton No 2. 118971
A.C. 337 (H.L.): Aitchison v. Lohre. 4 App. Cas. 755. at 760 (H L. 1879) (Iper Lord
Blackburn).
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there does not appear to be an authority which directly so holds, there now
exists a substantial body of dicta in support of this latter proposition. 10"
A right to in personam recovery has been recognized in other common
law jurisdictions. In an Irish case, In re Pike, "I a claim was made against
an estate for the value of services rendered by police constables who had
protected the property of the deceased. In allowing the claim, Porter M.R.
remarked:
[T]he police took the only reasonable and proper course in taking possession of
the house and property themselves, as there was no one else to take charge of
them .... The claim, of course, cannot be based on contract - that is out of
the question; but ... these constables have been the means of preserving, for
the benefit of the persons now entitled to it, this large amount of property ...
If this had been done by persons who were not policemen there can be no doubt
about the power of the Court to direct payment of suitable remuncra-
tion.... 10
The fact that the intervenors were police constables may lead one easily to
the conclusion that the intervention was unofficious. Porter M.R. does
suggest, however, that other good faith intervenors would be entitled to
relief.
The American Restatement sets forth a general rule permitting
recovery in cases of necessitous intervention to preserve property. i09 Thus
far, however, American courts have generally restricted recovery to cases
in which a person has come into lawful possession of property, either as an
agent of the owner or in some other fashion as an involuntary bailee, and
then finds it necessary to take measures for its care and protection. 11o
Thus, recovery has been allowed to buyers of goods who have rightfully
rescinded the agreement of sale, 11' to lessors who protect property left on
the premises by a departing lessee, 112 and to finders who protect goods
ultimately returned to their owners. 113
There are some authorities which appear to stand apart from these
limitations. In Berry v. Barbour114 recovery was granted to a repairman
106 The most colourful and influential of these is Bowen L.J.'s famous diction in
Falcke, supra note 103, which includes the statement quoted in text accompanying note
12, supra. Falcke concerns a payment made in pursuit of self-interest, rather than
altruism. See generally McCamus, supra note 11.
107 23 L.R. Ir. 9 (Ch. 1888). And see Allison v. Jenkins, [1904] 1 I.R. 341, at 348
(Ch. 1903) (per Sir Andrew Porter M.R.) (relying, by analogy, on the maritime principle
of general average).
0 8 Supra note 107, at 11-12.
109 RESTITUTION, supra note 4, at s. 117(1).
110 See generally PALMER, supra note 4, s. 10.3. And see Reporters' Notes on s.
117(l) in RESTITUTION, supra note 4.
"I Jones v. Healy, 237 App. Div. 264, 261 N.Y.S. 464 (1932); Truman's Pioneer
Stud Farm v. Hansen, 108 Kan. 717, 196 P. 1087 (1921); Sapp v. Bradfield, 137 Ky. 308,
125 S.W. 721 (1910); Alexander v. Walker, 239 S.W. 309 (Tex. Ct. App. 1922).
12 Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Co. v. Neville, 52 Neb. 574, 72 N.W. 854 (1897);
Preston v. Neale, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 222 (1858).
1"3 Amory v. Flyn, 10 Johns. 102, 6 Am. Dec. 316 (N.Y. 1813); Chase v. Corcoran,
106 Mass. 286 (1871). Contra, Bryan v. Akers, 177 Ark. 681, 7 S.W. 2d 325 (1928);
Burns Motor Co. v. Briggs, 27 Ohio App. 80, 160 N.E. 728 (1928).
114 137 Okla. 280, 279 P. 2d 335 (1954), noted in 53 MICH. L. REV. 1013 (1955).
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who intervened in necessitous circumstances to repair the defendant's roof.
The defendant had originally employed the plaintiff to effect roof repairs.
During the course of this work, the building caught fire and the roof was
partially destroyed. The defendant was, at this time, in Germany and the
plaintiff, without seeking his consent, proceeded to repair the roof in order
to prevent further damage to the building and its contents. It may be
thought, however, that Berry v. Barbour does not constitute a substantial
departure from the previous authorities, for there too the plaintiff may be
seen to have had a special relationship to the property in question. A
clearer break from the pre-existing relationship rationale is to be found in a
series of cases awarding restitution where the property of a deceased
person has been preserved pending the appointment of a personal
representative. "' In some of these cases, the plaintiff has had a
pre-existing relationship to the deceased. Thus, recovery has been granted
to employees of a deceased who continued to look after his affairs until the
appointment. 116 In other cases, however, claims against the estate brought
by third parties who had intervened in response to the requests of relatives
and other members of the deceased's household have been successful. "'
The difficult case, in America as in England, has been the fact
situation exemplified by Nicholson v. Chapman, the claim of a stranger
who intervenes to preserve property which has gone astray, and then seeks
recompense for costs incurred in his rescue effort. There are a number of
American cases denying in personam relief in these situations. "'8 The
particular concern which may set these cases apart is a reluctance to
develop a rule which might conceivably act as an incentive to malevolent
intervenors who would first put the property in peril and then seek to be
paid for its recovery. 19 This is not a telling point however. To the extent
that such concerns are realistic, they should be met by the burden which
falls on the plaintiff to establish that his intervention was unofficious.12
To deny relief in all such cases seems especially indefensible in the
"
5 See generally Annot.. 108 A.L.R. 388 (1937).
"
6 1n re Bryantfs Estate, 180 Pa. 192, 36 A. 738 (1897): Todd v. Martin. 4 Cal
Unrep. 805, 37 P. 872 (1894). Contra. Mathie v. Hancock, 78 Vt. 414, 63 A. 143 (1906).
17 Sibley Oil Co. v. Stein, 100 N.H. 356. 126 A. 2d 252 (1956); Wilder Grain Co.
v. Felker, 296 Mass. 177, 5 N.E. 2d 207 (1936). noted in 36 Min. L. REV. 144 (1937).
"'Kelley v. East Jordan Chemical Co.. 162 Mich. 525. 127 N.W 671 (t910);
Glenn v. Savage. 14 Or. 567. 13 P. 442 (1887): Bartholomev,, v. Jackson. 20 Johns. 28, II
Am. Dec. 237 (N.Y. 1822). And see Merritt v. American Dock & Trust Co.. 13 N.Y.S
234 (1891). For a suggestion to the contrary. see Ri-STITTI ION. supra note 4. at s. 1170I).
Comment b. Illustration 2.
"ISee Note, supra note 114, at 1014. And see Nicholson v. Chapman. supra note
19 (indicating a concern to protect owners from "'the wilful attempts of ill-designing
people to turn their floats and vessels adrift, in order that they might be paid for finding
them".).
12' Professor Hope's remark is apposite: 1l]t is not to be reasonably anticipated that
a policy thus carefully limited would breed overnight a nation of busy-bodies anxious to
perform useless and meddlesome services for others and to try their luck with the courts".
Hope, Officiousness, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 25. at 36 (1929).
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American context 12' and it may be that this line of authority is approaching
its eclipse. 122 In the interim, however, it constitutes an obstacle to those
who favour adoption of the general rule articulated in the Restatement. 2I
The only support to be found for a general rule allowing recovery in
the Anglo-Canadian case law is indirect. We have seen that the doctrine of
agency of necessity has been strained to capture what appear to be cases
of necessitous intervention. 124 Similarly, there is some evidence to suggest
that the courts will not be reluctant to infer a request in situations where
such intervention occurs. 125 The policy underlying the necessitous
intervention principle is also reflected in the rules of tort law relating to
trespassers and involuntary bailees. In both cases, conduct which would
otherwise be tortious will be excused if it amounts to a necessary and
reasonable intervention to protect another's property. Thus, one may enter
another's land and commit what would otherwise be a trespass if this
conduct was reasonably necessary to protect the owner's property. 126 The
trespasser will not be excused, however, if his conduct is officious. 127
121 The inconsistency is highlighted in Chase v. Corcoran, supra note 113, in which
the plaintiff failed to recover the cost of rescuing a boat which had gone adrift but was
allowed recovery for the value of subsequently effected repairs and storage.
122 The reasoning in these cases typically draws support from notions now discredited
in the other necessitous intervention authorities: (i) that liability for services rendered will
be imposed only where they are in response to an express or implied request: see, e.g.,
Wadleigh v. Katahdin Pulp & Paper Co., 116 Me. 107, 100 A. 150 (1917); Burns Motor
Co. v. Briggs, supra note 113; Bryan v. Akers, supra note 113; (ii) that such intervenors
are mere volunteers: see, e.g., Morse v. Kenney, 87 Vt. 445, 89 A. 865 (1914); Mathie v.
Hancock, supra note 116; (iii) that services rendered in an emergency are deemed by law to
be gratuitous: see, e.g., Glenn v. Savage, supra note 118, Bartholomew v. Jackson, supra
note 118. As to the latter point, see Hope, supra note 120, at 36-37; PALMER, supra note
4, at s. 10.3, 369.
'
23 See generally PALMER, supra note 4, at chs. 6-12.
124 See text accompanying notes 51-72, supra. And see Palmer v. Stear, 113 L. Jo.
420 (Cty. Ct. 1962) holding that a veterinary surgeon who intervened in an emergency to
destroy a seriously injured dog had acted as an agent of necessity.
125 See, e.g., Evans v. Schneider, 66 D.L.R. 758 (Alta. C.A. 1922) (negotiations for
sale of cattle fail, potential buyer in possession recovers cost of feeding the cattle on the
basis of an implied request).
126 Sherrin v. Haggerty, [1953] O.W.N. 962 (Cty. Ct.); Cope v. Sharpe (No. 2).
[1912] 1 K.B. 496, 81 L.J.K.B. 281 (C.A. 1911); Kirk v. Gregory, I Ex. 55,45 L.J.Q.B.
186 (1876). One who trespasses to protect his own property will also, it seems, be
excused. See Manor& Co. v. M.V. "Sir John Crosbie", 52 D.L.R. (2d) 48 (Ex. 1965),
aff'dsubnom. Munn & Co. v. M.V. Sir John Crosbie, [19671 I Ex. C.R. 94 (1966). in
the latter situation, of course, the argument for restitutionary compensation of the
involuntary benefactor is especially compelling. Nonetheless, it has thus far been
recognized only in the American case law. See Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co.. 109
Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910); RESTITUTION, supra note 4, at s. 122. And see
Sussmann, The Defence of Private Necessity and the Problem of Compensation. 2 OTTA WA
L. REV. 184 (1967).
127 Kirk v. Gregory, supra note 126; Sherrin v. Haggerty, supra note 126. In the
latter case, the owner had been notified of an impending hazard and had chosen to do
nothing. The intervenor was therefore liable in trespass and unsuccessful in a
restitutionary counterclaim.
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Similarly, an involuntary bailee who acts reasonably in disposing of
another's goods will not be guilty of conversion. 128
In sum then, there is little support for the view that in personanm
recovery in these cases will be allowed by English or Canadian courts.
Indeed, there is a body of dicta to the contrary. 129 This apparent reluctance
to reward necessitous intervention which preserves the property of another
is, it is argued, anomalous and should be reviewed in the light of modern
developments in restitutionary law. Support may be drawn for this view
from adictumn of Laskin J.A. (as he then was) in Regina v. Howson. i30 The
accused had been charged with theft, after towing away the complainant's
car and refusing to release it unless towing charges were paid. The owner
of property on which the complainant's car was improperly parked had
requested this intervention. A defence based on "colour of right" was
successful but the court indicated that a lien for the value of such services
would not be allowed. Laskin J.A. did suggest, however, that an
involuntary bailee ought in such circumstances to be entitled to an in
personan remedy:
If he . . . decides to remove it to an accessible place of safekeeping, I sould
hold that he should be entitled to recover the reasonable expenses incurred in
doing so. Such a view may not be quite consonant %,ith the attitude of the
common law that a person cannot ordinarily be made a debtor v,,ithout his
consent: See Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co ..... But I pray in aid the
expansion of the law of quasi-contract or restitution to support recognition of a
legal obligation to reimburse a person who has thus taken care of another's
goods which have been thrust upon him: See Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v
Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour. Ld. Deglnan v. Guaranty Trust Co.
of Canada and Constantineau ... 13i
It would be consistent, at least, with these views to hold that one who has
intervened in an emergency ought similarly to be entitled to reimburse-
ment.
The recognition of a general right to recover for necessitous
intervention should, of course, be accompanied by the usual limitations to
ensure that intervenors who act officiously will not be rewarded. a
Recovery should be denied where the intervenor failed to make reasonable
attempts to communicate with the owner or had reason to believe that the
owner did not wish him to act. Further, one who has acted with gratuitous
128 Elvin & Powell Ltd. v. Plummer Roddis. Ltd.. 50 T.L.R. 158 (K.B. 1933). See
also Heugh v. London & N.W. Ry., L.R. 5 Ex. 51, 39 L.J. Exch. 48 (1870): McKean v.
Mclvor, L.R. 6 Ex. 36.40 L.J. Exch. 30 (1870). But see Hiort v. Bott. L.R. 9 Ex 86.43
L.J. Exch. 81 (1874). And see generally BRO%, N ON PERSONAL PROPERTY. supra note 38.
at 319-31; G. PATON. BAILMENT IN THE COIMlON LA%% 114-17 (1952); Burnett.
Conversion by an Involuntary Bailee. 76 L.Q.R. 364 (1960). A more general privilege to
interfere with another's chattels in cases of emergency is suggested in the REsTt-STTMEN
(SECOND) OF TORTS s. 262-63 (1965).
12'See, e.g., Sorrell v. Paget, 11950] 1 K.B. 252. at 260. [194912 All E.R. 609. at
612 (C.A. 1949) (per Bucknill L.J.). And see cases cited notes 105-06. supra
130 [1966] 2 O.R. 63, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 582 (C.A.).
131 Id. at 74. 55 D.L.R. (2d) at 593.
132 See generally RESTITUTION. supra note 4. at s. 117.
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intent would not be permitted to convert his gift into a claim for
compensation. 133 Finally, as these benefits are unrequested, it will be
necessary to ensure that the service rendered is one which is truly of value
to the owner of the property in question. This would normally be
established by demonstrating that the intervention was a reasonable
response to an emergency and that the owner wishes to continue to assert
his dominion over the property. 134
4. Preservation of Credit
Where payment of another's debt is made in an attempt to preserve the
debtor's commercial credit, the intervenor is clearly one who has conferred
an unequivocal benefit in necessitous circumstances. The substitution of
the intervenor as the new creditor is not likely to be prejudicial 135 and the
payment of the debt itself is an obligation which, presumably, the debtor
originally assumed willingly. Provided that the intervention is unoffici-
ous, 136 the imposition of a restitutionary duty to reimburse the intervenor
thus seems appropriate.
This view is reflected in the rules of the law of negotiable instruments
relating to the acceptor for honour. 131 If a bill of exchange has been
protested for dishonour by non-acceptance or for better security, any
person who is not already a party to the bill may, with the consent of the
holder, accept the bill for the honour of any party already liable on the bill,
or for the honour of the drawer. 138 If the acceptor for honour is ultimately
required to pay the bill, he is then subrogated to the rights and duties of the
holder with respect to the party for whose honour he pays and all parties
liable to that party. 139 Thus, even though the party whose liability has been
discharged by the payment did not request this kindly intervention, an
obligation to reimburse the intervenor is imposed.
Whether there exists a general duty, apart from the negotiable
instruments cases, to reimburse a third party who pays another's debt is a
" See pp. 297-303, supra. Professor Woodward suggested that acts of necessitous
intervention to preserve property should be deemed gratuitous. See F. WOODWARD, THE
LAWOFQUASI-CONTRACrS s. 207 (1913). And see Glenn v. Savage, supra note 118. This
view is generally considered unsound and ought, in my view, to be rejected. See Hope,
supra note 120, at 36-38; PALMER, supra note 4, s. 10.3, at 370.
134 It is possible to conceive of situations - as where the preserved property had
been abandoned and the owner now disclaims ownership - in which the service rendered
should not be considered to constitute a benefit.
M3 Hence the debt is normally assignable. See generally CHESHIRE AND FIFoor's
LAW OF CONTRACT 493-515 (9th ed. M. Furmston 1976); G. FRIDMAN, Tt r LAW OF
CONTRACT IN CANADA 429-52 (1976); G. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 451-80 (4th
ed. 1975).
36 For an illustration of officiousness in this context, see Norton v. Haggett, 117 Vt.
130, 85 A. 2d 571 (1952). And see McCamus, supra note I1, at 552-53.
"
7 See generally BYLES ON BILLS 99-100, 121 (23d ed. M. Megrah & F. Ryder
1965); FALCONBRIDGE ON BANKING AND BILLS OF EXCHANGE ch. 57 (7th ed. A. Rogers
1969). And see RESTITUTION, supra note 4, at s. 117(2).
13SThe Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-5, s. 147.
'39 The Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-5, s. 155.
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much more difficult question. There is some support in the case law for the
view that an intervenor who pays off another's debt in order to protect his
own credit position is entitled to reimbursement. 140 One might argue that if
this is so, one who intervenes in good faith to protect the debtor's position
ought, a fortiori, to be entitled to relief. Nonetheless, the courts have
indicated some reluctance to permit recovery in such cases. "' Two
reasons are commonly given for this. First, it is sometimes said that mere
payment of another's debt does not discharge the debt. 142 If this is so,
mere payment does not have the effect of conferring a benefit. Secondly, it
is said that intervenors in such circumstances are mere volunteers and, as
such, ought not to be given a right to reimbursement.1 43 In my view,
neither of these reasons is sound. I have argued elsewhere for a
reconsideration of the rule denying relief in the context of claims brought
by intervenors acting in their own self-interest.144 Provided that such
parties have acted unofficiously and that the debtor is not prejudiced by the
substitution of a new creditor, it is arguably unjust that the debtor should
be enriched at the intervenor's expense. The unofficious intervenor ought
not to be dismissed as a mere volunteer. The debt should be considered
discharged unless subsequent events indicate that the creditor does not
accept or act on this view. 145 Whatever the merits of that position,
however, the arguments favouring recovery seem all the more persuasive
in the context of altruistic intervention. Certainly it would be consistent
with the general thrust of the necessitous intervention case law to hold that
such conduct ought to be rewarded by reimbursement and this, indeed,
appears to have been accepted recently by the English Court of Appeal as
the proper view.' No doubt. the range of fact situations in which
"0 See Butler v. Rice. [1910] 2 Ch. 277. 79 L.i. Ch. 652.
141 See, e.g., In re Cleadon Trust. Ltd.. 119391 Ch. 286, [19381 4 All E.R 518
(C.A. 1938). And see McCamus. supra note II. at 554-58.
142 See Lucas v. Wilkinson. I H. & N. 420. 156 E.R. 1265 (Ex. 1856); Simpson v.
Eggington. 10 Ex. 845. 156 E.R. 683 (1856): Belsha%, v. Bush. II C.B. 191. 138 E.R
444 (1851). See Birks & Beatson. Unrequested Pa'ynent of Another's Debt, 92 L.Q.R.
188 (1976). But see Hirachand Punamchand v. Temple. 119111 2 K.B. 330, 80 L.J.K.B.
1155 (C.A.); Cook v. Lister, 13 C.B.. N.S, 543 (1863); Pellait v. Boosey. 8 Jut N S
1107. 31 L.J.C.P. 281 (1862). And see S. STOt JAR. Tim LAV1% ot- QU-%isCoWTRNc(
143-44 (1964). For a discussion of the competing vie%,s on this question. see McCamus,
supra note 1I. at 557-58.
4'See, e.g., In re Cleadon Trust. Ltd.. supra note 141.
'44 See McCamus. supra note I1. at 550-58.
"I For elaboration of this point, see id. at 558.
'See the dictum of Scarman L.J. in Oven v. Tate. 119751 2 All -.R. 129. at 134,
[1975] 3 W.L.R. 369. at 375 (C.A. 1974): "'[Tlhe fundamental question is %,heiher in the
circumstances it was reasonably necessary in the interest of the volunteer or the person for
whom the payment was made. or both. that the payment should be made - %%hether in the
circumstances it was 'just and reasonable' that a right of reimbursement should arise."
Seealsoper Stephenson L.J. at 136.1197513 W.L.R. at 378:n re a Debtor. 119371 1 Ch.
156. at 166, [1937] I All E.R. 1. at 10 (C.A. 1936) (per Greene L.J.); Anson v. Anson.
[1953] 1 Q.B. 636. at 642-43. 11953] I All E.R. 867. at 869-70 (per Pearson J.)
Adopting this view should carry %,.ith i  the implication that the debt is discharged by the
creditor's acceptance of the payment as a discharge. See Birks & Beatson. supra note 142,
at 201, 207.
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recovery would be allowed will be very narrow, as it will normally be the
case that the debtor can be contacted and his consent secured. Where this
is not so, however, and where the intervenor is moved to act, for example,
to save the debtor from forfeiture of property or an acceleration of interest
charges, there appears to be a compelling case for restitutionary relief. 147
B. Fulfilment of Another's Duty
1. Fulfilment of Another's Duty to Bury the Dead
The primary responsibility for the burial of a deceased person falls
upon his personal representatives who are, in turn, entitled to be
indemnified for these expenses from the estate as a first charge. 148 The
common law also establishes that other parties may have a secondary duty
to bury, which may become operative if the estate is inadequate to bear this
burden. Thus, it is the duty of the surviving spouse to bury the
deceased. 149 Indeed, prior to the enactment of married women's property
legislation,150 the husband was primarily responsible for the burial of his
deceased wife at common law. 151 With the enactment of this legislation,
however, the rationale for the common law rule disappeared and it was
ultimately held that the primary burden was to be assumed by the
deceased's estate. 152 Further, it has been said that a parent, if of sufficient
147 Cf. Drager v. Allison, 13 D.L.R. (2d) 204 (Sask. C.A. 1958). A father had paid
off a mortgage debt before it was due in order to save the mortgagor children from interest
charges. The house was subsequently resold by the children, who refused to reimburse the
father. At trial it was held that the father recovered in unjust enrichment. The trial judge
was reversed in the Court of Appeal, but was affirmed, on other grounds, by the Supreme
Court of Canada: [1959] S.C.R. 661, 19 D.L.R. (2d) 431.
1483 Co. Inst. 202. See Schara Tzedeck-v. The Royal Trust Co., [1953] I S.C.R.
31, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 529; Edwards v. Edwards, 2 C. & M. 612, 149 E.R. 905 (Ex. 1834).
See generally WIDDIFIELD ON EXECUTORS' ACCOUNTS ch. 1 (5th ed. F. Baker 1967).
"9 Annot., 2 C.C.C. 257 (1899).
150 Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75. See generally
Cullity, Property Rights During the Subsistence of Marriage, in STUDIES IN CANADIAN
FAMILY LAW 179 (D. Mendes da Costa ed. 1972).
"5 Bradshaw v. Beard, 12 C.B., N.S. 344, 142 E.R. 1175 (C.P. 1862); Ambrose v.
Kerrison, supra note 68. The duty obtains even though they be separated: Routtu v.
Routtu, 35 M.P.R. 94, [1955] 1 D.L.R. 627 (N.B. Cty. Ct. 1954); Jenkins v. Tucker, 1 H.
BI. 90, 126 E.R. 55 (C.P. 1788).
1,52 Rees v. Hughes, [1946] 1 K.B. 517, [1946] 2 All E.R. 47 (C.A.). It is
established that a husband who is also an executor or administrator may reimburse himself
from the estate. In re Estate of Mailman, 15 M.P.R. 169, [194012 D.L.R. 721 (N.S.S.C.
in Banco), aff'd on other grounds [ 1941 ] S.C.R. 368; Re Asma, [ 1950] O.W.N. 291 (Surr.
Ct.); In re M'Myn, 33 Ch. D. 575, 55 L.J. Ch. 845 (1886). Contra, Re Montgomery, 20
Man. R. 444, 17 W.L.R. 77 (K.B. 1911);Re Sea, II B.C.R. 324, 1 W.L.R. 460 (S.C.
Chambers 1905). The claim of a husband who was not appointed administrator was
disallowed, however, in Re Spencer, [1955] O.W.N. 325, [1955] 4 D.L.R. 221 (Surr.
Ct.). The better view is that expressed in obiter dictum by Weatherston J.A. in Pearce v.
Diensthuber, 17 O.R. (2d) 401, at 402, 81 D.L.R. (3d) 286, at 288 (C.A. 1977):
The logic of the matter leads one to conclude that the primary responsibility for
the wife's funeral expenses is now on the executor or administrator, and that if
the husband pays first, which according to common practice and decency he
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means, is responsible for the burial of a deceased child. ' In the case of a
married child, the duty of the surviving spouse is of a higher order and the
parents are entitled to seek from the survivor indemnification of such costs
as cannot be borne by the estate. 114 As well, it has been suggested that a
common law duty to bury is imposed upon the owner of the premises in
which the deceased has died. 155
Finally, it must be noted that a statutory duty is commonly imposed
on municipalities to bury an unclaimed body found within their limits. 156
Typically, the statutory duty is residual in nature in the sense that
indemnification from those having a common law duty to bury will be
allowed. 157.
Restitutionary claims for reasonable expenses15 8 may arise where one
with a secondary duty seeks indemnification from the estate,' or from
one with a higher duty.016 As well, successful claims may lie where a
friend, relative or stranger' 6 ' has intervened in a responsible fashion.
Indeed, an undertaker who has been invited by a stranger to the deceased to
supply services will have a direct claim against the estate. I62
usually must do. he is entitled to reimbursement out of his wife's estate, to the
extent that assets are available.
And see, to the same effect. WOODWARD, supra note 133. at s. 206.
113 Regina v. Newcomb. 2 C.C.C. 255 (N.S. Cty. Ct. 1898); Clark v. London Gen.
Omnibus Co., [1906] 2 K.B. 648. 75 L.J.K.B. 907 (C.A.); Regina v. Vann. 2 Den. 325.
169 E.R. 523 (Q. Sess. 1851).
'54 Pearce v. Diensthuber. supra note 152. at 402. 81 D.L.R. (3d) at 287-88.
1'5 Regina v. Stewart. 12 Ad. & E. 773. 113 E.R. 1007 (Q.B. 1840); Regina v,
Newcomb, supra note 153.
6See. e.g., The Anatomy Act. R.S.O. 1970. c. 21. s. II.
'3 The Anatomy Act. R.S.O. 1970. c. 21. s. 11. And see Davey v. Rural
Municipality of Cornwallis. 39 Man. R. 259, at 263. 119311 2 D.L.R. 80. at 83-84 (C.A.)
(per Robson J.A.) suggesting that under similar Manitoba provisions the municipality
might be able to recover against the owner of premises in %%hich a person is found dead
even though the statute did not expressly so provide.
'5 The expense may not exceed what is suitable to the deceased's circumstances:
Tugwell v. Heyman. 3 Camp. 298. 170 E.R. 1389 (K.B. 1812). It is. hoever, legitimate
to act in accord with the wishes of the deceased: McDougall & Bro%%n Ltd. v. Breckon.
[1943] O.W.N. 705 (Cty. Ct.). See generally WIDDI-ttt D. supra note 148. at 4-8.
'5 See, e.g., cases which allow recovery by surviving husband against the estate, at
note 152. supra.
'
60 See, e.g., Pearce v. Diensthuber. supra note 152 (parents recovering from
surviving husband). Presumably. the owner of premises subject to a duty could recover
from a surviving spouse or parent though there appears to be no authority on point.
161 See, e.g., Routtu v. Routtu. supra note 151 (son): Tkachuk v. Uhryn. 6 W.W.R,
515 (Sask. Dist. C. 1952) (daughter); Bradshaw v. Beard, supra note 151 (brother);
Ambrose v. Kerrison. supra note 68 (distant relative). Some strangers ma). of course.
have a duty to act. See supra note 155. And see Gladstone v. Murray Co.. 314 Mass. 584.
50 N.E. 2d 958 (1914) (corporation in which deceased held shares); Cape Girardeau Bell
Telephone Co. v. Hamil. 160 Mo. App. 521. 140 S.W. 951 (1911) (employer), And see
generally Annot.. 35 A.L.R. 2d 1399 (1954).
62 Rogers v. Price. 3 Y. & J. 28. 148 E.R. 1080 (Ex. 1829); DaveN v. Rural
Municipality of Cornwallis. supra note 157: McDougall & Brown Ltd. %. Breckon. supra
note 158.
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Although it has occasionally been suggested that liability in these
cases is premised on an implied request,163 it is clear that the remedy is
imposed by law in the absence of any manifestation of express or implied
consent. 164 The obvious desirability of prompt action and the impractica-
bility, in many cases, of communication with the executors provide a
rationale for the granting of relief even though the intervention is
unrequested. Thus in Davey v. Rural Municipality of Cornwallis, ' a
plaintiff who, without having been requested to do so, had buried an
unidentified body, was allowed recovery against the defendant municipal-
ity, the latter being under a statutory duty to make such arrangements. On
behalf of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, Robson J.A. noted that "the
liability was enforced although there was no prior contract and, obviously,
because of the necessity of the circumstances". 166
The plaintiff must not have acted officiously in the place of a more
appropriate party. 167 Again, reimbursement would not be allowed if the
expenditures had been intended as a gift. 168
2. Fulfilment of Another's Duty to Support a Spouse or Children
(a) The Duty to Support a Spouse
The duty of a husband to support his wife was recognized at common
law. However, since the common law did not permit actions between
husband and wife, the duty could only be indirectly enforced by the wife
through her ability to pledge her husband's credit. 169 As indicated
previously, though her ability to do so is often rationalized in terms of
agency of necessity, 171 the third party supplier's claim against the husband
is better viewed as being restitutionary in nature.
163 See, e. g., Rees v. Hughes, supra note 152, at 527, [194612 All E.R. at 52 (per
Tucker L.J.).
1' The earlier cases clearly indicate that the obligation is imposed in order to
reimburse one who has, in necessitous circumstances, discharged the duty of the
defendant. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Tucker, supra note 151, at 93, 126 E.R. at 57 (per Lord
Loughborough).16 5Supra note 157.
'
661d. at 262, [1931] 2 D.L.R. at 83.167 See Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N.Y. 574, at 583, 17 Am. Rep. 384, at 392 (1875);
Quin v. Hill, 4 Dem. 69 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1886) (intermeddling parent). And see generally
Hope, supra note 120, at 44 et seq.
'
68 Coleby v. Coleby, L.R. 2 Eq. 803, 14 L.T. 697 (V.C. 1866).
169 Right House Ltd. v. Esseltine, [1951] O.W.N. 871 (C.A.); Hughes v. Rees. 10
P.R. 301 (Ont. Master 1884),rev'don other grounds 9 O.R. 198 (Ch. D. 1885); Biberfeld
v. Berens, [1952] 2 Q.B. 770, [1952] 2 All E.R. 237 (C.A.); Eastland v. Burchell. supra
note 55; Read v. Legard, 20 L.J. Exch. 309, 155 E.R. 698 (1851); lies v. lies, 145 L.T.
71, 47 T.L.R. 396 (P.D.A. 1931); Manby v. Scott, I Sid. 109, 82 E.R. 1000 (Ex. Ch.
1663). In England, however, the wife's ability to borrow or pledge credit "as agent of
necessity" has been abolished. See the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970.
U.K. 1970, c. 45, s. 41. In Ontario, the doctrine stricto sensit has been abolished, but an
implied authority to pledge credit during cohabitation has been retained. See The Family
Law Reform Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 2, s. 33.
'70 See text accompanying notes 53-56, supra.
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A statutory duty of support is now a common feature of matrimonial
causes statutes. 171 Indeed, recent reforms have imposed reciprocal duties
of support on both husband and wife, 1 72 and have extended this obligation
to "spouses" who, though unmarried, have cohabited for a specified
period of time. 1 It may be then, that the duty to support a spouse in need
will be fulfilled by compliance with the terms of an award enforcing a
statutory duty of support. Where this has not occurred, however, it is
possible that situations of necessitous intervention could arise in which the
intervenor should be permitted a restitutionary claim. 174
(b) The Duty to Support Children
At common law, a father had no direct legal duty to provide support
for his children. 175 Although it was often stated that he was under a moral
obligation to do so, the only recognition given this duty was quite indirect.
It was accepted that the wife's ability to pledge her husband's credit
extended to cover expenses incurred in supplying necessaries to minor
children of the marriage, of whom she had custody. '16
An enforceable parental duty of support has been created by statute. It
is an offence under the Criminal Code for a parent, in certain stipulated
circumstances, to fail to provide necessary support for a child under the
age of sixteen years. 177 Further, explicit duties of support and appropriate
enforcement mechanisms are commonly found in modern matrimonial
causes and child protection statutes. 178 Additionally, of course, various
17 See generally MacDougall, Alimony and Maintenance, in STUDIES IN CANADIAN
FAMILY LAW, supra note 150, at 283 et seq.
172See, e.g., The Family Law Reform Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 2, s. 15.
17 3 The Family Law Reform Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 2, s. 14(b).
174 See, RESTITUTION, supra note 4, at ss. 113-14. And see PALMER, supra note 4, s.
10.4, at 377-79. In jurisdictions such as England in which the deserted wife's agency of
necessity has been abolished and in which it has been assumed that this doctrine supplied
the rationale for the husband's liability to suppliers of necessaries, the granting of
restitutionary relief may be considered to be inconsistent with the statutory reform. Cf.
The Family Law Reform Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 2, s. 33. which appears to invite the
same interpretation. And see ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON FAMILY
LAW, PART VI, SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS 133-35 (1975).
175 Cleaver v. Cleaver, [19491 O.W.N. 640, [19491 4 D.L.R. 367 (C.A.), Childs v.
Forfar, 51 O.L.R. 210, 67 D.L.R. 17 (C.A. 1921). Wright v. McCabe. 30 O.R. 390 (Div'l
Ct. 1898); Coldingham Parish Council v. Smith, [1918] 2 K.B. 90, 87 L.J.K.B. 816
(1917); Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 482, 151 E.R. 502 (Exch. of Pleas 1840).
Contra, Nicole v. Allen, 3 C. & P. 36, 172 E.R. 312 (K.B. 1827). And cf. Bazeley v.
Forder, L.R. 3 Q.B. 559, at 564 (1868) (per Blackburn J.), Urmston v. Newcomen, 4 A. &
E. 899, 111 E.R. 1022 (K.B. 1836).
176 Bazeley v. Forder, supra note 175. The issue as to whether a third supplier could
recover from the husband without invoking the wife's agency of necessity was left open in
Urmston v. Newcomen, supra note 175.
177 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 197.
178 See, e.g., The Family Law Reform Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 2, ss. 16 & 18.
See also s. 17, which imposes a duty on children who are not minors to provide support for
their parents. See generally MacDougall, supra note 171, at 344 et seq.
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publicly funded agencies may provide support to children in need. "I The
occasions on which third party intervention will be necessary may,
therefore, be somewhat rare, but it is possible to conceive of situations, as
where immediate medical attention is required, in which restitutionary
recovery may be awarded to an unofficious intervenor. 180 Apart from such
cases of urgent necessity, however, it seems unlikely that an intervenor
could establish that his conduct was unofficious unless an attempt had been
made to communicate with the parents in order to establish whether, save
this intervention, the child's needs would not be met by the parents or by
some other more appropriate party. 181
3. Fufilhnent of the Statutory Duty of Another to Act in the Public
Interest
(a) Public Authorities
We have seen that one who intervenes in necessitous circumstances to
fulfil the duty of a public authority to bury the dead may seek
indemnification on restitutionary principles.182 This rule appears to be
capable of extension to other situations in which there is an immediate
need to take action to preserve public health or safety, action which would
otherwise be undertaken by a public agency in discharge of a duty imposed
by statute. Similarly, it may be appropriate to award relief where the
failure or refusal of a public agency to discharge its duty gives rise to a
situation of emergency to which a stranger responds.
Frequently, for example, a statutory duty is imposed on
municipalities to provide medical assistance to indigent persons, 18" An
early English authority held that a stranger who intervened "under
pressure of immediate want" to supply medical assistance to an indigent'
person could recover from the parish officers whose duty to supply such
services had thus been fulfilled. 184 There is ample American authority to
the same effect. 185 And, though there are a number of Saskatchewan
'179 Such agencies may be given a statutory right of reimbursement against the party
owing the duty of support. See, e.g., The Family Law Reform Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 2,
s. 18(3).180Cf. Urmston v. Newcomen, supra note 175. American authority permits
recovery for necessaries supplied. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 169 Tenn. 589, 89 S.W. 2d
763 (1935); De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, 203 N.Y. 460, 96 N.E. 722 (Ct. App. 1911);
Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151,44 N.W. 295 (1890); Pretzinger v. Pretzinger. 45 Ohio St.
452, 15 N.E. 471 (1887); Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. Super. 426, 97 A. 2d 390 (1953);
Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13 Johns. 480, 7 Am. Dec. 395 (N.Y. 1816). And see
generally PALMER, supra note 4, s. 10.4, at 379-81.
18 1 See RESTITUTION, supra note 4, at ss. 113-14. And see Greenspan v. Slate,
supra note 180 (holding, on close facts, that the immediacy of the medical emergency
obviated the need to contact the parents).
182 Davey v. Rural Municipality of Cornwallis, supra note 157.
183See, e.g., The Public Health Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 377, s. 56.
184 Simmons v. Wilmott, 3 Esp. 91, 170 E.R. 549 (C.P. 1800).
185 See WOODWARD, supra note 133, at s. 204: Annot., 93 A.L.R. 900 (1934).
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decisions denying relief in such circumstances. ""' surely the better view is
that liability on restitutionary principles may be imposed. 18' Indeed. as has
been suggested above.' 8 this appears to be the proper explanation for the
result in cases such as Hastings v. Village of Sentans"' which have
imposed liability on the basis of strained applications of the agency of
necessity doctrine.
Though it seems appropriate to compensate the suppliers of such
services who have acted in an emergency. a right to restitution ought not to
arise in situations where it was practicable to communicate %%ith the public
agency and the supplier did not do so. 190 Such interventions are officious.
However, where the agency is unable to respond to the emergency or
refuses to do so. the intervenor's conduct is unofficious and should provide
a basis for recovery.
Apart from cases of medical necessity, it is arguable that restitution-
ary relief ought to be available to those who discharge a public agency's
duty to take measures to preserve the safety of the public. In Holborn
Union v. Vestry of St. Leonard. 192 for example, a local authority failed to
discharge its statutory duty to remove dust and ashes from a workhouse
owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was permitted recover), of the costs it
incurred in carrying out this task. The plaintiff had acted properly to
protect the health of the inmates and. said Mellor J.. "it %kould be
1 6 Jackes v. Village of St. Walburg. 1193113 W.W R. 534 (Sask C A.). Sutherland
v. Rural Municipality of Canwood, [19251 3 W.W.R. 781 (Sask. Dist. C.). See also
Black v. Rural Municipality of Edenvold. 119301 3 W.\VR. 529. 119311 I D L R. 577
(Sask. C.A. 1930). The latter case. however. ought not to be vie\%ed as one of necessitous
intervention. as the plaintiff supplied services over a considerable period of time %,.ithout
attempting to communicate with the defendant.
117 The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Count) of Carleton % CIiN of
Ottawa. supra note 7. establishes that liabilit\ may be imposed on a 1uncipahtN on unjust
enrichment grounds where the services have been unofficiousl\ supplied b% a plaintiff
acting under a mistake. It follows from this decision, and indeed from general principle.
that one who has acted unofficiously in an emergenc, may invoke a restitutionar) theon of
liability.
Case law in the western provinces has narro\,ly interpreted applicable tatutor,
provisions so as to deny recovery in cases w.here the statutor) requirement of a %ritten
order has not been met. See Wagner v. Municipal Dist. of Pine Lake. 119311 2 W W R
481, [193114 D.L.R. 258 (Alta. C.A.), Rose v. Rural Municipalit\ of Blame Lake. 119351
3 W.W.R. 15 (Sask. Dist. Ct.). Insofar as these decisions ma\ be viewed as support for
the broader proposition that municipalities are. in principle, immune from restitutionarn,
liability for benefits of this kind. they cannot survive Count) of Carleton v Citi of Ottas, a
"sSee text accompanying notes 57-59. supra.
"
9 Supra note 57. See also Irvine v. Parish of Stanley. 37 N.B.R. 572 (C.A. 1906);
Coles v. Rural Municipality of Wawken, [1928] 3 W.W.R. 532 (Sask. Dist. C.). aff d
[1929] 1 W.W.R. 663, [1929] 4 D.L.R. 1071 (Sask. C.A.).
'" Noble County v. Niemann. 182 Okla. 497. 78 P. 2d 672 (19381; Burnham v
Lincoln County, 128 Neb. 47. 257 N.W. 491 (1934). Cf. Black v. Rural Municipality of
Edenwold. supra note 186.
191 Noble County v. Niemann. supra note 190. The point %%as raised and left
unanswered in Sutherland v. Rural Municipality of Cansood. supra note 186
1922 Q.B.D. 145.46 L.J.Q.B. 36 (1876).
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unreasonable to hold that the duty cast upon [the defendants] can be
enforced only by indictment or mandamus". 193 Consider, further, the
claim of one who repairs a road or bridge in dangerous condition after the
responsible municipality has refused to do so. Such claims find support in
the Restatementt 94 and are consistent with general principle, but are not
likely to arise in practice as public authorities, when contacted, are prone
to act swiftly in such matters, if only to avert potential liability for injuries
resulting from the state of disrepair. 195
A more general right to intervene in the public interest has been tested
in the American case law, primarily in the context of claims brought by
parents who have discharged the statutory duty of a school board to
provide school transportation for their children. In a number of such cases,
relief has been awarded.16 The underlying principle was stated in
Sommers v. Putnam County Board of Education 197 in the following terms:
The obligation must be of such a nature that actual and prompt performance
thereof is of grave public concern; the person upon whom the obligation rests
must have failed or refused with knowledge of the facts to perform the
obligation; or it must reasonably appear that it is impossible to perform it; and
the person who intervenes must, under the circumstances, be not a mere
intermeddler but a proper person to perform the duty. M98
Although it may be doubtful that Canadian courts would extend recovery
beyond the obvious cases of peril to physical health and safety, the
American school transportation cases do indicate that there may be other
situations in which the intransigence of a public authority may give rise to
a situation of grave public concern in which unofficious intervention would
merit restitutionary relief.
A limiting factor in these cases may arise from a concern to
discourage intervention by private parties which might impair the ability of
public authorities to exercise a discretion to determine the level and timing
of their expenditures in the light of their own perception of the public
'
93 1d. at 149, 46 L.J.Q.B. at 38.
194 RESTITUTION, supra note 4, at s. 115, Comment b. But see Macclesfield Corp.
v. Great Cent. Ry., [19111 2 K.B. 528, 104 L.T. 728 (C.A.).
191 Although the municipality's conduct may amount to non-actionable nonfeasance
at common law, a statutory liability for damages sustained by reason of failure to repair is
commonly imposed by statute. See, e.g., The Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 284, s.
427. Cf. French v. Lewis and Clark County, 87 Mont. 448, 288 P. 455 (1930), noted il 29
MICH. L. REV. 119 (1930) (permitting recovery even though the repairs did not appear to
be a matter of urgency).
196 Rysdam v. School Dist. No. 69, 154 Or. 347, 58 P. 2d 614 (1936); Sommers v.
Putnam County Bd. of Educ., 113 Ohio St. 177, 148 N.E. 682 (1925), Eastgatc v. Osago
School Dist., 41 N.D. 518, 171 N.W. 96 (1919). Contra, Bruggeman v. Independent
School Dist. No. 4, 227 Iowa 661, 289 N.W. 5 (1939). In Halliday v. Marchington. 44
Ohio App. 132. 184 N.E. 698 (1932), it was held that the plaintiff ought to exhaust his
administrative remedies before supplying the transportation. See also Noble v. Williams,
150 Ky. 439, 150 S.W. 507 (1912) (teachers who paid expenses of running a school denied
recovery).197 Supra note 196.
198Id. at 184, 148 N.E. at 684.
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interest. Such concerns could not weigh heavily in situations of immediate
peril to public health and safety; nor should they, I would argue, in other
situations where prompt intervention is in the public interest, where
official intransigence or incapacity has been established, and where the
intervenor is an appropriate person to discharge the duty in question. In the
absence of such considerations, or in situations where the lack of a clearly
defined statutory duty suggests that a broad discretion has been conferred
on the public authority to determine whether or not to act, it would be
appropriate to discourage intervention and to restrict the aggrieved citizen
to such redress as is available through the usual mechanisms of indictment,
mandamus'9 9 and the political process.
(b) Others
Apart from cases of substitutional performance of what are now
commonly statutory duties of support, considered above, it is conceivable
that statutory duties may be imposed on individuals or non-governmental
corporate entities to carry out undertakings in the public interest. Again,
where the breach of such a statutory duty creates a situation of imminent
peril to public health or safety, it is consistent with principle that one who,
being a proper person to do so, intervenes to avert the hazard should be
entitled to recover in restitution. It may often be that a public authority is
the most appropriate party to intervene and, where this is the case, it may
be argued that it would be officious to intervene without first inviting the
public authority to do so unless, of course, timely communication with the
authority is impracticable. Where the public authority does intervene,
however, it would appear to have an especially compelling argument for
relief. Nonetheless, in Macclesfield Corp. v. Great Central Railway2 0 0 the
English Court of Appeal rejected a claim brought in a situation of this kind.
The defendant railway company was subject to a statutory duty to keep a
certain bridge roadway in repair. The bridge having fallen into disrepair
and become dangerous, the plaintiff, the highway authority for the district,
requested the defendant to carry out its statutory duty. Upon the latter's
refusal, the plaintiff undertook the repairs and claimed the costs of so
doing. The court held that the plaintiff, being under no legal obligation to
act, was a volunteer and therefore not entitled to recover.
The Macclesfield case thus provides an impediment to necessitous
intervention claims in this category of situations. The case might be
distinguished on the basis that a restitutionary claim was apparently neither
pleaded nor considered. Or one might agree with Woodward's rather more
1" On the availability of mandamus, see generally S.A. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 480-505 (3d ed. 1973). It appears that mandamus is
not available to compel a municipality to discharge its duty to maintain roads, it being
suggested that indictment is the proper course. See. e.g.. Cummings v. Town of Dundas.
13 O.L.R. 384 (Div'l Ct. 1907); Nobel v. Rural Municipality of Turtle Mountain, 15 Man.
R. 514, 2 W.L.R. 144 (K.B. 1905).
9ooSupra note 194.
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blunt assessment that the decision is simply erroneous.20 ' In my view,
Macclesfield is clearly inconsistent with the restitutionary principles
manifested in the necessitous intervention case law and ought not to be
followed. Support for this view can be drawn from a line of American
authority permitting recovery by public authorities in circumstances of this
kind . 20 2
C. Response to an Emergency Created by Another's Breach of a Common
Law Duty in Tort or Contract
I. Tort
When a stranger intervenes to render necessary services to a victim of
tortious conduct, a situation arises which is tantalizingly analogous to the
previously considered instances of discharge of another's duty. A road
accident resulting in physical injury, for example, may lead to the
intervention of friends, relatives or strangers to provide needed assistance
to the victim. A physician may supply medical care, a neighbouring
municipality may provide firefighting or other rescue services, friends or
relatives may provide support during convalescence. The need for such
services arose as the direct result of the tortfeasor's breach of his common
law duty. He could be held liable for the cost of most, if not all, of these
services in the victim's action in tort. May one not argue, therefore, that
the supply of such services confers a benefit on the tortfeasor at the
supplier's expense for which a direct action by the supplier against the
tortfeasor should be allowed?
In a recent Ontario case, it has been suggested that such a claim may
be possible. In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Crompton,2 03 firemen
from a neighbouring municipality were summoned to the scene of an
accident which had occurred on a provincial highway as a result of the
defendant's negligence. The firemen extinguished a fire and rescued an
occupant from one of the cars involved. Both the municipality and the
province sued the tortfeasor for the cost of the services rendered by the
municipality, the municipality pleading its case on several grounds, one of
which was unjust enrichment. The municipality's claim failed as it had
been fully compensated for its services by the province pursuant to an
agreement with the province to provide services of this kind. Had there not
been such an agreement, said Haines J., the municipality could have
succeeded in restitution on the basis of the necessitous intervention case
law.2 0 4 In my view, such a cause of action should be recognized only in a
very limited range of situations.
201 WOODWARD, supra note 133, at 334-35.
20 Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, at 204, 19 L. Ed. 2d 407.
at 416-17 (1967); United States v. Boyd, 520 F. 2d 642 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 423
U.S. 1050, 96 S. Ct. 776 (1976) (removal of sunken vessels creating a hazard to
navigation).
203 14 O.R. (2d) 659, 74 D.L.R. (3d) 345 (H.C. 1976).
204 Id. at 662, 74 D.L.R. (3d) at 348, citing Matheson v. Smiley, supra note 74. in
support.
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In cases of this kind, where the victim has not been required to pay for
the services rendered to him, the difficult question is whether the tortfeasor
or the intervenor (or, perhaps, the victim) will ultimately bear the burden
of the expense involved in their supply. It may be that the most
straightforward analysis of this question would result if the victim were, as
a general rule, precluded from claiming as damages in tort the value of
benefits received for which he has not paid and, further, if the question of
allocating the burden of these costs as between the supplier (the -'collateral
source") and the tortfeasor were to be determined in a direct claim by the
former against the latter for indemnification of the expense which he has
saved the tortfeasor by his intervention. For reasons which need not be
elaborated here, our law has not followed this pattern. Under present law,
the liability of the tortfeasor to bear such costs is normally tested in the
victim's claim against the tortfeasor through application of the collateral
source rule. 20 5 Further, the ability of the collateral source to recoup the
value of the benefit conferred will normally be ascertained through the
application of subrogation doctrine2 6 or through a direct claim against
the victim. 217 The combined effect of these liability rules is to treat the
position of the collateral source as a derivative of the victim's rights
against the tortfeasor and to resolve, in this indirect fashion, the question
of whether the tortfeasor or the collateral source must bear the cost of the
latter's intervention. In the rare instances in which a direct claim for
reimbursement has been brought against the tortfeasor, it has usually
failed. 208
205 See generally FLEMING, supra note 51. at 224-31.
2G6See generally GOFF AND JONES, supra note 6, at 406-45; PALIER. supra note 4,
ch. 23, at 436-76. Subrogation doctrine may permit the collateral source to enforce the
victim's rights against the tortfeasor or, where the victim has already successfully
recovered in tort, to bring a claim against the victim for reimbursement.
207 The collateral source may have a contractual right against the victim.
Alternatively, where the intervention, though unrequested. amounts to a necessitous
intervention, recovery should be allowed in restitution. Here one relies by analogy on
Matheson v. Smiley, supra note 74. See also Birks, Restitution for Senices, 27 CURRENT
LEG. PROB. 13, at 33-35 (1974). Occasionally. in cases where the collateral source has not
actively asserted a claim against the victim, a result consistent with this view, has been
achieved by the imposition of a condition on the victim's award from the tortfeasor that the
victim reimburse the collateral source. See, e.g.. Coderre v. Ethier, 19 O.R. (2d) 503, 85
D.L.R. (3d) 621 (H.C. 1978); Myers v. Hoffman, [1955] O.R. 965. 1 D.L.R. (2d) 272
(H.C.); Schneider v. Eisovitch, [1960] 2 Q.B. 430.119601 1 All E.R. 169 (1959); Dennis
v. London Passenger Transp. Bd., [1948] I All E.R. 779, 64 T.L.R. 269 (K.B.). But see
Blundell v. Musgrave, 96 C.L.R. 73 (H.C. 1956). Lord Denning M.R. has pro-
posed as a solution to these problems that the victim be deemed to hold that portion of
the award which reflects the value of the service rendered by the collateral source in trust
forthe latter: Cunningham v. Harrison, [1973] I Q.B. 942. at 952. 119731 3 All E.R. 463,
at 469 (C.A.).
208 Porter v. Grand Trunk Pac. Ry.. 11919] 1 W.W.R. 988, 45 D.L.R. 749 (Alta.
C.A.); Receiver for the Metropolitan Police Dist. v. Croydon Corp., 119571 2 Q.B. 154,
[1957] 1 All E.R. 78 (C.A. 1956). rev'g [1956] 2 All E.R. 785 (Q.B.), affg. sub nor.
Monmouthshire County Council v. Smith. 11956] 2 All E.R. 800 (Assizes). This case
overruled Receiver for the Metropolitan Police Dist. v. Tatum. 11948] 2 K.B. 68, [1948] 1
All E.R. 612.
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As a general matter, this derivative analysis of the position of the
collateral source seems preferable to the mechanism of a direct restitution-
ary claim against the tortfeasor for a number of reasons. The tortfeasor
will be spared a multiplicity of lawsuits. The compromise of tort claims
will be unencumbered by difficult calculations of potential direct liabilities
to collateral sources. Moreover, the derivative approach forces the parties
to bring on the tort claim and thus clearly establish the extent of the
tortfeasor's liability. If the tortfeasor's liability in tort is not in fact tested
by the victim, the benefit conferred on the tortfeasor may appear to be
rather chimerical. A successful restitutionary claim would hold him liable
for the reduction of a potential liability which never did, in fact, accrue.
Further, under existing rules, if the tort liability is tested by suit, the
tortfeasor (unless saved by an exception to the collateral source rule) will
be held liable for the cost or value of the supply of items rendered
necessary by his tortious conduct. If this occurs, of course, it can no
longer be maintained that the tortfeasor has been unjustly enriched.
Hard cases may arise, however, in circumstances where an exception
to the collateral benefit rule excuses the tortfeasor from liability with
respect to the cost or value of the benefit in question. The issue between
the victim and the tortfeasor may not be formulated as one of unjust
enrichment of the tortfeasor at the expense of the collateral source, but
rather as one of determining whether the victim should be compensated for
an expense which he has not incurred."20 If the latter approach is adopted,
denial of recovery in tort may create a situation in which the tortfeasor has,
in some sense, profited at the supplier's expense. In Porter v. Grand
Trunk Pacific Railway210 a physician claimed for medical and hospital
services supplied to four labourers injured as a result of the defendant's
negligence. The victims' employer had established a hospital (financed by
employee wage deductions) which was under the control and direction of
the plaintiff. After the workmen were admitted to the hospital, the plaintiff
sent a telegram to the tortfeasor, indicating that the necessary treatment
would be rendered "at your expense". In the tort action brought by the
labourers, a claim was made for the value of the medical services.
Although the action was generally successful, this particular item was
disallowed. Accordingly, the physician, alleging that he had not been paid
for the services rendered, thereupon brought his own claim for indemnifi-
cation against the tortfeasor, arguing that a contract to indemnify could be
implied from the tortfeasor's failure to reply to the telegram. 2 t 1 This
argument failed and the physician's claim was dismissed. What would
appear to be an unjust enrichment of the tortfeasor here could occur in
other situations where the value of benefits received from a collateral
source is not allowed as a head of damage in the tort claim. Thus if, as has
209See generally FLEMING, supra note 5 I, at 224-3 I.
210Supra note 208.
211 The claim was founded in contract rather than restitution, as the contract was
alleged to be one which could be inferred from certain conduct of the parties.
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occasionally been suggested, 2 12 the value of necessary services supplied,
apparently gratuitously, by relatives and friends (who may endure financial
costs in so doing) cannot be claimed by the victim, it seems unjust that the
tortfeasor should profit from this benevolence. Nonetheless, direct claims
against tortfeasors by donors have been denied. 2 13
Further, we may note that although timely intervention on subroga-
tion principles may avoid injustice in some of these cases, the availability
of the subrogation remedy will turn on the nature of the relationship
between the collateral source and the victim, and will not be invariably
available simply because the tortfeasor will otherwise be enriched at the
expense of the collateral source.21 4 Moreover, the denial of subrogation
may reflect, in some instances, a determination that the collateral source
(being, for example, an institution in the business of distributing risks) is
the appropriate party to bear the risk. 1 5 In such cases, arguably, the
enrichment of the tortfeasor is not unjust.
In sum then, the interaction of the existing tort and subrogation rules
will often yield a result which will prevent an unjust enrichment of the
tortfeasor at the expense of the collateral source. Yet this may not be, in
every situation, a conscious objective of the analysis. Accordingly, there
is some risk that an unjust enrichment may occur. The Porter case 216
illustrates this phenomenon. In such situations, the cause of action
suggested by Haines J. would usefully fill a lacuna in the existing remedial
framework.' 17 It is suggested, however, that in order to avoid conflict with
2See, e.g., Haggar v. de Placido. [1972] 2 All E.R. 1029. 11972] 1 W.L.R. 716
(Chester Crown Ct.), noted in 88 L.Q.R. 323 (1972) and overruled by Donnelly v. Joyce,
[1973] 3 All E.R. 475, [1973] 3 W.L.R. 514 (C.A.), noted in [1974] CAMB. L.J. 40.
Proposals of the English Law Commission which would put the matter beyond chance
and allow the victim to recover the value of reasonable expenses gratuitously incurred by
others or the reasonable value of necessary services gratuitously supplied have not, as yet,
been acted upon by Parliament. See THE LA\V COMMISSION. REPORT ON PERSONAL INJURY
LITIGATION - ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES, LAW CoMi. No. 56 paras. 112-14 (1973). It
may be, however, that a liberal interpretation and application of the holding in Donnelly v.
Joyce would provide a more comprehensive solution to this problem.2 13 See Rawson v. Kasman. [1956] O.W.N. 359, 3 D.L.R. (2d) 376 (C.A.);
Admiralty Comm'rs v. S.S. Amerika, 11917] A.C. 38, 86 L.J.P.D. & A. 58 (H.L. 1916).
In Ontario, recent family law reform legislation has conferred a cause of action on the
spouse of the victim and on other members of the immediate family permitting recovery,
inter alia, of the "actual out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred for the benefit of the
injured person" and, where nursing, housekeeping or other services are supplied, "a
reasonable allowance for loss of income or the value of the services". The Family Law
Reform Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 2, s. 60. See also ONTARIO LAW REFORM COIMISSION,
REPORT ON FAMILY LAW, PART I, TORTS ch. 10 (1969).
214 See generally sources cited note 206, supra.
2' See generally Feldthusen, Pure Economic Loss Consequent upon Physical
Damage to a Third Party, 16 WESTERN ONT. L. REV. 1. at 67-91 (1977).
216 Supra note 208.
217 For an exploration of the possibility of a direct action in tort by the collateral
source for the economic loss sustained as a result of the tort committed against the victim.
see Feldthusen, supra note 215. Analogical support may be drawn from Ontario statutory
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the policies underlying the existing rules, two restrictions on the
availability of this remedy should be recognized. First, it ought not to be
available where the collateral source is adequately protected by the
remedies available under established tort and subrogation doctrine. 218
Secondly, a direct restitutionary claim ought not to succeed where the
collateral source is, as against the tortfeasor, the appropriate party to
distribute the risk which has accrued.
A variation on the factual pattern under consideration here suggests
further possibilities for restitutionary analysis. Let us assume that a timely
intervention has the effect of counteracting the negligence of a potential
tortfeasor and thus prevents the accident from occurring. The intervenor
has conferred a benefit on the negligent actor by forestalling potential tort
liability. In these circumstances, the argument for restitutionary recovery
is much more straightforward. There being no tort claim to be prosecuted,
the granting of direct restitutionary relief does not risk conflict with the
policy underlying subrogation or collateral source doctrines. Liability on
this basis has not, however, been tested. 21 9
2. Contract
Failure to perform a contractual duty to provide support to another
may create an emergency to which a stranger to the agreement responds by
providing the needed support. Restitutionary claims by such strangers
against the defaulting promisors are reported in the American case law.
The authorities are divided. 20 The Restatement favours the view that
provisions which confer a direct right of action against the tortfeasor on relatives who have
supplied benefits to the victim. See note 213, supra. Interestingly, however, the Ontario
provisions appear not to adopt the "derivative view" of the cause of action of the relatives
argued here. The provisions do not explicitly preclude the possibility of both the victim
and the relative bringing claims for the value of such benefits. Presumably, courts would
prevent instances of double recovery by either denying compensation to the victim in cases
where the relatives had already achieved success or, alternatively, by reading into the
Statute an equivalent limitation on the cause of action conferred on the relatives.218 Cf. Donnelly v. Joyce, supra note 212, at 480, [1973] 3 W.L.R. at 519-20 where
Megaw L.J. suggests that as a corollary to the rule that the victim may claim in tort the
value of gratuitously supplied benefits, the suppliers would have no direct action against
the tortfeasor "unless at any rate some very special circumstances exist, such perhaps as
the anomalous or anachronistic rules regarding loss of consortium or loss of services".
219 The point has been mooted by one American writer. Hope. supra note 120, at
40-41. See also PALMER, supra note 4, s. 10.6, at 409-10.220 For cases denying recovery, see Wilson v. Combs, 203 Miss. 286, 33 So. 2d 830
(1948); Richardson v. Richardson, 207 N.C. 314, 176 S.E. 744 (1934); Matheny v.
Chester, 141 Ky. 790, 133 S.W. 754 (1911); Savage v. McCorkle, 17 Or. 42, 21 P. 444
(1889); Moody v. Moody, 14 Me. (2 Shep.) 307 (1837). For cases allowing recovery, see
In re Mach, 71 S.D. 460, 25 N.W. 2d 881 (1947), noted in 46 MICH. L. REV. 115 (1947),
which held that a stranger who fulfilled a duty of support undertaken by a grantee in a
conveyance of land was entitled to be subrogated to the grantor's equitable lien on the land:
Henry v. Knight, 74 Ind. App. 562, 122 N.E. 675 (1919); Forsyth v. Ganson, 5 Wend.
558, 21 Am. Dec. 241 (N.Y. 1830). See also Annot., 31 A.L.R. 658 (1924), which
reviews the case law concerning support obligations expressly charged against property.
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recovery be allowed and this may be supported on the basis of the
necessitous intervention principle .22  The stranger in such a case has
unofficiously conferred a benefit in the form of fulfilment of the
defendant's contractual obligation.
IV. CONCLUSION
An examination of the case law permitting recovery to the altruistic
intermeddler across a broad range of factual situations thus yields
considerable evidence in support of the view that the courts have accepted
the validity of a general principle of necessitous intervention of which
these individual instances of recovery are merely specific applications.
The general principle is hedged with limitations which appear to ensure
that recovery will not be permitted where the intervention is officious or
where the conduct of the intervenor is not beneficial. Thus, recovery will
be denied where it would have been practicable to seek consent to
intervene, or where the intervenor should have deferred to a more
appropriate party. The conduct of the intervenor must have been
reasonable and must have been undertaken in the best interests of the
benefited party. Further, recovery will not be permitted if the intervenor
acted with the intention of making a gift of his services.
It is abundantly clear that the juristic basis of the necessitous
intervention principle is neither contractual nor tortious. Although some of
the earlier cases did suggest that relief is premised on an implied request
for the intervention, it seems to be now well accepted that the obligation is
one imposed by law. 222 It is evident that these obligations are not imposed
on the basis that the defendant's conduct is tortious. The remedy is made
available simply to permit unofficious intermeddlers to recover the value
of benefits conferred. Accordingly, it is properly categorized together with
other instances of what are now recognized in Canada, as in the United
States, to be applications of a more general principle of unjust
enrichment. 223
The one factual situation which has resisted resolution along these
lines in the English and Canadian case law is necessitous intervention to
preserve another's property. It is argued here that the apparent reluctance
of the courts to grant such relief is an indefensible anomaly. It may well be
that clear recognition of the unjust enrichment rationale underlying the
22 Supra note 4, at s. 114. The RESTATEMENT subsumes this situation together with
cases of fulfilment of statutory duties within a general rule that one who performs the tt)"
of another to supply necessaries is entitled to restitution provided that 'the things or
services supplied were immediately necessary to prevent serious bodily harm to or
suffering by such person". This proviso is unduly restrictive, as there does not appear to
be a reason grounded in public policy for refusing relief for the unofficious conferral of
other kinds of needed goods and services.
222 See, e.g., In re Rhodes, supra note 16: Matheson v. Smile). supra note 74.
223 The connection between the necessitous intervention case law and the unjust
enrichment principle seems to have been expressly adverted to by Laskin J.A. (as he then
was) in Regina v. Howson, supra note 130.
1979]
336 Ottawa Law Review [Vol. 11:297
necessitous intervention cases may assist in the evolution of rules
permitting recovery in such cases.
Finally, it must be emphasized that there is an historical overlap
between the necessitous intervention principle and the extended and rather
artificial application of the agency of necessity doctrine which has been
described above. The suggestion made here is that the clarity of the
analysis of these problems would be much enhanced if the operation of the
agency of necessity doctrine were restricted to what has been termed above
the true agency model. Cases involving a pre-existing relationship in
which a power to deal with the unforeseen emergency can reasonably be
implied into the terms of the agreement between principal and agent
constitute the proper domain of the agency of necessity doctrine. Where
such powers cannot realistically be inferred, the unjust enrichment analysis
offers a more straightforward conceptual framework within which to assess
the intervenor's claim.
